Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 1 892
pro vyhledávání: '"jel:H41"'
Publikováno v:
Workshop CEREGMIA "économie expérimentale"
Workshop CEREGMIA "économie expérimentale", Mar 2010, Schoelcher, Martinique
Economic Inquiry
Economic Inquiry, 2013, 51 (2), pp.1421-1441. ⟨10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00452.x⟩
Economic Inquiry, Wiley, 2013, 51 (2), pp.1421-1441. ⟨10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00452.x⟩
27èmes journées de microéconomie appliquée
27èmes journées de microéconomie appliquée, Jun 2010, Angers, France
Workshop CEREGMIA "économie expérimentale", Mar 2010, Schoelcher, Martinique
Economic Inquiry
Economic Inquiry, 2013, 51 (2), pp.1421-1441. ⟨10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00452.x⟩
Economic Inquiry, Wiley, 2013, 51 (2), pp.1421-1441. ⟨10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00452.x⟩
27èmes journées de microéconomie appliquée
27èmes journées de microéconomie appliquée, Jun 2010, Angers, France
Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short-run. Could the introduction of pre-play threa
Autor:
Paul Missios, Ida Ferrara
In this paper, we consider households' decision of whether to recycle within a theoretical framework that allows for the inclusion of social and moral motivations. The former comes from valuing social approval while the latter comes from valuing self
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::713bedefc13990cfc0be3a1872022bb7
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4417056
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4417056
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(2), 666-707. Wiley-Blackwell
We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systema
Using French data, we provide: a) causal evidence that a drop in local public goods provision decreases private sector activity, and b) evidence consistent with monopsony power of the public sector in local labor markets. We introduce a public sector
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3063::ef1e025f2829fa96ac4313cf7d74e219
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/5tqdseqksb93a9s4o6tla4ftjs
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/5tqdseqksb93a9s4o6tla4ftjs
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 21:1221-1265
We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments,
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 65:1455-1468
Why do individuals volunteer their time even when recipients receive far less value than the donor’s opportunity cost? Previous models of altruism that focus on the overall impact of a gift cannot rationalize this behavior, despite its prevalence.
Publikováno v:
Research in Transportation Economics.
The provision of public goods plays a key role in the survival of leaders in democracies. Assuming that mass rail transport shares many of the characteristics of public goods, we claim that the public provision of railway services is more beneficial
Autor:
Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò
Publikováno v:
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We have also received very useful comments from Pablo Amorós, Carmen Beviá, Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón, Humberto Llavador, Be
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d451a904f1786cf39f7099a62f1f26ce
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/408190
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/408190
Autor:
David P. Myatt, Chris Wallace
In a collective-action game a player`s payoff is the sum of (i) a private component that depends only on that player`s action, and (ii) a public component, common to all players and dependent upon all actions. A classic application is the private pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::e24487656dd066a24680c244d5b0f8c5
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:af631ab2-bbf7-4afb-9090-637e7bae7dff
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:af631ab2-bbf7-4afb-9090-637e7bae7dff
Autor:
David P. Myatt, Chris Wallace
This paper studies n-player collective-action games in which a public good is produced if and only if m or more volunteers contribute to it. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team of m players succes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fada58ed60d5804ce94955537eb31a5e
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:842d2bfb-9bf7-4a5b-8393-0f363db22db7
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:842d2bfb-9bf7-4a5b-8393-0f363db22db7