Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 672
pro vyhledávání: '"jel:D86"'
Autor:
Angyridis, Constantine, Sen, Debapriya
This paper seeks to explain two related phenomena: (i) it is often the case that when the newvariety of a product is launched, some consumers do not purchase the latest variety and (ii)the quality of the latest variety of a product is often not signi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::46e105e7163c6409c9c8cb4d134856f0
https://doi.org/10.32920/ryerson.14636745.v1
https://doi.org/10.32920/ryerson.14636745.v1
Autor:
René Kirkegaard
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 51:589-612
I extend the canonical moral hazard model to allow the agent to face endogenous and non-contractible uncertainty. The agent works for the principal and simultaneously pursues private rewards. I establish conditions under which the first-order approac
Publikováno v:
Quantitative Economics. 11:349-397
We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and E
Trust between parties should drive contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation ex ante to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. consult
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::17988528d501aff227a23b55ae1ae125
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261462
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261462
It is well known that in the presence of asymmetric information, adverse selection has detrimental effects on possible exchanges. We go a step further, and present a game-theoretic setup in which under such adverse selection effects there are uncerta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::9c2612dbac32d36c0be2f83329b635d8
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-199002
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-199002
Publikováno v:
The Review of International Organizations. 14:453-477
We present a model with two donors-principals that provide funds to a unique recipient-agent. Each donor decides how to allocate his aid funds between a pooled and a donor specific unilateral project. The production function of development depends po
Publikováno v:
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 92:580-607
A government wants to exploit a renewable resource, yielding a time-varying flow of rent, by leasing it at a fixed rate. Leasing contracts can be expropriated before expiration, albeit at a cost. To minimise transactions costs and avoid the ‘resour
In many rural settings, informal mutual support networks have evolved into semiformal insurance groups, such as funeral societies. Using detailed panel data for six villages in Ethiopia, we can distinguish two types of contracts, in terms of whether
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::19e7d1f4e1a3a9e3a5a7b5390d2e0267
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f38538b8-6d43-4757-ad16-f163e9cde11d
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f38538b8-6d43-4757-ad16-f163e9cde11d
Autor:
Mark Armstrong
This paper surveys models of markets in which some consumers are "savvy" while others are not. We discuss when the presence of savvy consumers improves the deals available to non-savvy consumers in the market (the case of search externalities), and w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ef630bae4ef7dbfff3a61bfeea082117
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:8e1edf8b-064f-4ef1-aa07-2001ad812678
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:8e1edf8b-064f-4ef1-aa07-2001ad812678
Autor:
Thomas Norman, Heinrich H. Nax
The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases. The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::8f93ee8eb5afba37fba180d39bfc10a5
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:976a366c-e502-43dc-87fe-4791667477d5
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:976a366c-e502-43dc-87fe-4791667477d5