Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 1 303
pro vyhledávání: '"jel:D71"'
Autor:
Kikuta, Kyosuke
Publikováno v:
IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper. 859
What are the effects of religious participation on collective action such as protests? Until recently, conflict scholars have focused on macro-level characteristics of religion, while assuming, but rarely analyzing, individual-level mechanisms. I fil
Autor:
Peter J. Hammond
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 60:121-134
Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto conditio
Autor:
Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 183:213-257
What is the meaning of ‘majoritarianism’ in a judgement aggregation problem when the propositionwise majority view is logically inconsistent? We argue that the majoritarian ideal is best embodied by the principle of supermajoritarian efficiency (
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 17, no.1, p. 29-49 (2019)
The Journal of economic inequality
The Journal of economic inequality
We propose a new approach to multidimensional poverty measurement. To aggregate and weight the different dimensions of poverty, we rely on the preferences of the concerned individuals rather than on an arbitrary weighting scheme selected by the analy
Autor:
Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò
Publikováno v:
Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We have also received very useful comments from Pablo Amorós, Carmen Beviá, Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón, Humberto Llavador, Be
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d451a904f1786cf39f7099a62f1f26ce
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/408190
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/408190
Publikováno v:
ASC Working Paper Series. Leiden: African Studies Centre
ISSUE=90;TITLE=ASC Working Paper Series
ISSUE=90;TITLE=ASC Working Paper Series
Previous analyses of the formation and comparison of community based organizations (CBOs) have used cross section data. So, causal inference has been compromised. We obviate this problem by using data from a quai-experiment in which villages were for
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e4f9e28179fd7bc38abeafd8c2605fdd
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a299b93e-c3bf-4ed1-83a3-c833db80f288
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a299b93e-c3bf-4ed1-83a3-c833db80f288
Autor:
Ernesto Dal Bo
When optimal policymaking is subject to dynamic inconsistencies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), but shocks hit the economy after private agents form expectations, there is a trade off between the need to commit to a policy, and the need to retain discr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::9319124197fb2ad3af7d66100f97ce74
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b51ed60f-848c-4724-94f7-f085cdfe8649
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b51ed60f-848c-4724-94f7-f085cdfe8649
Autor:
Dal Bo, Ernesto
Publikováno v:
Dal Bo, Ernesto. (2004). Bribing Voters. Law and Economics Workshop. UC Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Law and Economics. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0kz070vz
We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d3ec8094dae276be75dd481546bfe093
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f6d17f89-5eb0-4530-8e1d-f74d28330a18
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f6d17f89-5eb0-4530-8e1d-f74d28330a18
Autor:
Ozkes, Ali, Sanver, M. Remzi
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______777::82f8ba21b9ff0dd2e314f7156cfff9bd
https://epub.wu.ac.at/7507/
https://epub.wu.ac.at/7507/
Autor:
Urs Fischbacher, Simeon Schudy
We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form v
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a30810017c7810b86bf0d3a98a4555e5