Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 836
pro vyhledávání: '"jel:D70"'
Autor:
Godfrey Cadogan
We augment Tversky and Khaneman (1992) (“TK92”) Cumulative Prospect Theory (“CPT”) function space with a sample space for “states of nature”, and depict a commutative map of behavior on the augmented space. In particular, we use a homotop
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a6674adffa32c638be1f969bef6e1cf8
https://doi.org/10.32920/ryerson.14641974.v1
https://doi.org/10.32920/ryerson.14641974.v1
This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cb74677d263aae5a7ae9f1606e0f653a
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:255834c2-34a9-4324-8207-2a8e7137bc42
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:255834c2-34a9-4324-8207-2a8e7137bc42
Autor:
Moritz Drexl, Andreas Kleiner
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 10:253-271
Which decision rule should we use to make a binary collective choice? While voting procedures are applied ubiquitously, they are criticized for being inefficient. Using monetary transfers, efficient choices can be made at the cost of a budget imbalan
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 126:347-380
We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inecient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? Under an
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 71:79-87
We augment a standard allocation experiment to investigate whether, and to what extent, individuals are willing to limit others’ choices and change their own choices concerning an environmental project when they are given responsibility for others
Autor:
Marco Mariotti, Roberto Veneziani
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal. 128:1609-1633
Opportunities in society are commonly interpreted as 'chances of success'. Within this interpretation, should opportunities be equalised? We show that a liberal principle of justice and a limited principle of social rationality imply that opportunity
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algorithm provides a way of finding the minimum cost tree mm. This has led to several definitions in the literature, regarding how to distribute the cost.
Autor:
Klingelhöfer, J
In using their citizen candidate framework, Besley and Coate (2001) fi nd that if citizen candidates with sufficiently extreme preferences are available, lobbying has no in fluence on equilibrium policy. I show that this result does not hold in a mod
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::672d88f1abea0edf4abfe6db00d0702f
https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/46557/1/1562901_Klingelhoefer.pdf
https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/46557/1/1562901_Klingelhoefer.pdf
Publikováno v:
Local Government Studies
This article analyses how the presence of a dominant group of voters within the electorate affects voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that both the absolute size and the relative power of a dominant group influence voters' decision-making process
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::88e6277e051051aea166fe8c113833ff
https://biblio.vub.ac.be/vubir/david-and-goliath-in-the-poll-booth-group-size-voting-power-and-voter-turnout(36bbe5a0-9e32-4090-8f2f-a524139ac17a).html
https://biblio.vub.ac.be/vubir/david-and-goliath-in-the-poll-booth-group-size-voting-power-and-voter-turnout(36bbe5a0-9e32-4090-8f2f-a524139ac17a).html
Publikováno v:
Computational Economics. 49:653-675
Attainment of rational expectations equilibria in asset markets calls for the price system to disseminate agents’ private information to others. Markets populated by human agents are known to be capable of converging to rational expectations equili