Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 179
pro vyhledávání: '"jel:D45"'
Publikováno v:
Economics of Innovation and New Technology. :1-18
We introduce a fairly general licensing model with an endogenous industry structure - in terms of number of active firms - and general licensing contracts. We show that when the patentee can employ contracts that can condition on market entry or pric
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9b2c9c3585f37a3d1db60cff63ca8f7e
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2020.1761590
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2020.1761590
Autor:
Yuanzhu Lu, Sougata Poddar
Publikováno v:
Economic Modelling. 42:250-256
We show that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the insider patentee in spatial models irrespective of the size of the innovation or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. The result provides a simple justification of the prevale
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bf4d437429b756b8ebf6ef36b962fa85
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.016
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.016
Autor:
Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe
Publikováno v:
Research Policy. 43:179-189
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5de274fbc765d41bb5abf2ed1bd6878b
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011
Autor:
Daniel Quint
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 6:23-57
Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools—arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators—between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::54386e416ce4c18252e967e9928bdb49
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.23
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.23
Tax havens or tax hells? A discussion of the historical roots and present consequences of tax havens
Publikováno v:
Financial Theory and Practice, Vol 37, Iss 3, Pp 311-360 (2013)
Financial theory and practice
Volume 37
Issue 3
Financial theory and practice
Volume 37
Issue 3
Tax havens are not recent phenomena. However, in contrast to historical precedents, tax havens in the age of mobile capital allow for non-consensual transfers and are not profitable for every citizen. We discuss the four main groups of tax havens (fo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9cd50f22a67e67d256c76de151e4af3b
https://doi.org/10.3326/fintp.37.3.4
https://doi.org/10.3326/fintp.37.3.4
Autor:
Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff
Publikováno v:
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik. 39:71-90
Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Vor- und Nachteile alternativer Allokationsmechanismen für das 900- und 1800-MHz-Frequenzspektrum, dessen Nutzungsrechte Ende 2016 auslaufen. Im Wesentlichen bestehen zwei Optionen. Zum einen die Möglichkeit d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::39210ac195eb61f3920b6a1363948ac0
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03373040
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03373040
Autor:
Luke Hu
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 13:179-189
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, publicly pledge to pay a financial reward to every contractor he has invited
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1847c3a11b482ed911e87f40b3695901
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0015
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0015
Autor:
Patrick Bajari, Jeremy T. Fox
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 5(1):100-146
We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995–1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9ba6e9c9f10d234665f534bc5997a5a2
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.1.100
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.1.100
Autor:
James Schummer, Rakesh Vohra
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 5:164-85
Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarante
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3c658bc7e73dd899c7a8d9692df5bbed
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.2.164
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.2.164
Autor:
Paul Klemperer, Jeremy Bulow
The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the eleasticity of demand exceeds the elas
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::7cdae14c98da68de966f43b1e294f814
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:15b200a5-d7b1-4c25-9ea1-158f2b62caf2
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:15b200a5-d7b1-4c25-9ea1-158f2b62caf2
