Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 1 673
pro vyhledávání: '"jel:D44"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Cultural Economics, 47, 279-301. Springer Verlag
We find evidence for the behavioral biases of anchoring and loss aversion. We find that anchoring is more important for items that are resold quickly, and we find that the effect of loss aversion increases with the time that a painting is held. The e
Publikováno v:
Journal of Labor Economics. 40:157-185
Pre-College human capital investment occurs within a competitive environment and depends on market incentives created by Affirmative Action (AA) in college admissions. These policies affect mechanisms for rank-order allocation of college seats, and a
Autor:
Anouar El Haji, Sander Onderstal
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 28:670-686
In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that determine the sequence of service to queued customers. In the server-initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer in the
Autor:
Quah, J, Strulovici, B
The single crossing property plays a crucial role in monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), yet in some important applications the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived. Difficulties often arise because the propert
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https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::d18b5062fccfa8ac1c7593f16f9649c9
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f68b7498-2c7f-48de-895c-89dc3758e551
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f68b7498-2c7f-48de-895c-89dc3758e551
Autor:
Alan Beggs, Kathryn Graddy
This article presents an empirical study of paintings that have failed to meet their reserve price at auction. In the art trade, it is often claimed that when an advertised item goes unsold at auction, it will sell for less in the future. We have con
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https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c514800d-20e8-4132-b640-8bb32c3695f1
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c514800d-20e8-4132-b640-8bb32c3695f1
Autor:
Klemperer, P
This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that
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https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:209b288c-4ea0-4c9b-925e-861d5cf3284e
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:209b288c-4ea0-4c9b-925e-861d5cf3284e
Autor:
Renaud Foucart, Jana Friedrichsen
We study two platforms competing for members by investing in network quality. Quality is complementary to the network size: the marginal utility generated by an additional member increases with the network's quality. Platforms are imperfect substitut
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https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e8faa07f-6ebb-4d3f-8082-97a6f13bfb6b
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e8faa07f-6ebb-4d3f-8082-97a6f13bfb6b
Autor:
Marra, Marleen
This paper presents, solves, and estimates the first structural auction model with seller selection. This allows me to quantify network effects arising from endogenous bidder and seller entry into auction platforms, facilitating the estimation of the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3063::072e8aeef7938896b73593ccd54a65d4
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb
Publikováno v:
Journal of mathematical economics, 76, 33-44. Elsevier
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficient ex post equilibrium when the bidders are heterogeneous in both their exposures to, and their attitudes toward, the ensuing risk the asset will gene
Autor:
Peyman Khezr, Flavio M. Menezes
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 47:1329-1350
This paper studies a sales mechanism, prevalent in housing markets, where the seller does not reveal or commit to a reserve price but instead publicly announces an asking price. We show that the seller sets an asking price such that, in equilibrium,