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pro vyhledávání: '"jel:C70"'
Publikováno v:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 123:60-83
This paper studies optimal monetary and fiscal policies in an economy à la Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Lagos and Wright (2005) with multiple cash and credit goods. We show that optimal policies are in general time inconsistent due to insufficient nu
Autor:
Uno, Yoshifumi
Publikováno v:
廣島大學經濟論叢. 42(1・2):33-75
私たちは、本研究ノートで、1980年代に考察されるようになった心理ゲームをとりあげる。とりわけ、Matthew Rabin, “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No.
Autor:
Uno, Yoshifumi
赤面は嘘を暴露し、次の瞬間、言いしれぬ決まり悪さをもたらす。しかしながら、信頼が求められている状況で、「赤面する人」というレッテルは大きな優位性をもたらすかもしれない
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::a28d497153b8e91c58ae5f6cb29237ef
http://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/00050945
http://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/00050945
Autor:
Siemens, Ferdinand A. von
Although the elderly are more vulnerable to COVID-19, the empirical evidence suggests that they do not behave more cautiously in the pandemic than younger individuals. This theoretical model argues that some individuals might not comply with the COVI
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______603::31c928a56013c027cd743c4bd3f5d445
http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/files/57391/SSRN-id3770589.pdf
http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/files/57391/SSRN-id3770589.pdf
Autor:
Chris Wallace, Gavin Cameron
During the Bretton Woods era, OECD countries grew at historically unprecedented rates. This Golden Age has many possible explanations, ranging from the return to liberal policies in international trade to a backlog of profitable growth opportunities
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f78f7d13411910d36791b56a2562be1c
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:da8a3e11-72d1-40ae-b9e6-04b3c1a149d5
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:da8a3e11-72d1-40ae-b9e6-04b3c1a149d5
Autor:
Norman, T
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched to play a symmetric 2 £ 2 game in biological fitnesses. Each agent is biased in favor of one of the strategies, and receives a no
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::d371fabe4a0b2994e47704b1ca2bc6b9
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f34d6cbc-9dbd-4f14-b0e3-caa11a664ce1
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f34d6cbc-9dbd-4f14-b0e3-caa11a664ce1
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 126:347-380
We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inecient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? Under an
Autor:
Olivier Tercieux, Yeon-Koo Che
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2019, 127 (5), pp.2301-2342. ⟨10.1086/701791⟩
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2019, 127 (5), pp.2301-2342. ⟨10.1086/701791⟩
International audience; We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::24762ac6b978f770cc6bea2f071a25ab
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02087847
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02087847
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2018, 10 (4), pp.1-26. ⟨10.1257/mic.20150240⟩
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2018, 10 (4), pp.1-26. ⟨10.1257/mic.20150240⟩
In this paper, we study bidding behavior by firms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e. auctions in which the winning bid is the one which gets closest to some function (average) of all submitted bids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty-contest
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3901d71653f588592889d7aff24ed0cc
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01619040
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01619040
Autor:
Alberto Vesperoni
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 47:905-937
A contest is a game where several players compete for winning prizes by expending costly efforts. We assume that the outcome of a contest is an ordered partition of the set of players (a ranking) and a contest success function assigns a probability t