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Social Efficiency of Entry in an Open Economy

Autor: Han, Tien-Der, Haque, M. Emranul, Mukherjee, Arijit

Publikováno v: Han, T-D, Haque, M E & Mukherjee, A 2022, ' Social Efficiency of Entry in an Open Economy ', B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 203-219 . https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2020-0097

We show that cost asymmetry between the domestic and foreign firms is not necessary for the occurrence of insufficient entry in the domestic country. This result provides a rationale for pro-competitive domestic policies even in the absence of cost a

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a4fe8cdafd0c0863eb1a89e281b3041f
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2020-0097

Informational rents and the excessive entry theorem: The case of hidden action

Autor: De Pinto, Marco, Goerke, Laszlo, Palermo, Alberto

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if there is business stealing. This prediction assumes that production costs reduce profits and welfare equally. However, this need not be the case. If there is asymmetric information, suppliers o

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::c2b865cc1f8698da0728870ffed82cd9
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268732

Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure

Autor: Laszlo Goerke

The so‐called excess‐entry theorem establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournot‐oligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalize the approach and analyze the behavior of a competiti

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::606100b01aae20de565d6488bbd37e5b
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265030

Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power

Autor: Thomas Trégouët, Jerome Pouyet, David Martimort

Publikováno v: International Journal of Industrial Organization
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2021, ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102791⟩

International audience; An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer and faces the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surp

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a550b9727e7ce8a15529a421e2dfdc65
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03328387