Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"efficient information aggregation"'
Autor:
Johanna M. M. Goertz
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 11, Iss 1, p 2 (2019)
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/910d2e059dec41d7abd283ee1b41eac7
Autor:
Johanna M.M. Goertz, Kirill Chernomaz
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 10, Iss 2, p 20 (2019)
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4bd211648f664f29a2b6d0e7ae19b8c3
Autor:
Hans Peters, Irem Bozbay
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters, 180, 46-49. Excerpta Medica, Elsevier Science
We study the problem of designing a voting rule which makes voting by cut-off strategies efficient for settings where voters have state-dependent common preferences over and vote on accepting or rejecting an issue but hold private information in the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ba218439bed3512f2178559c0091c5d7
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/bb2f76e2-0a9e-4a3f-9342-488c92b78fe1
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/bb2f76e2-0a9e-4a3f-9342-488c92b78fe1
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Bozbay, Irem, Peters, Hans
We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::b095a3f5a67274e266a727784eef9d92
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::99c8cc017d81a779131e73d8f90b63ea
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2017032
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2017032
We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od________83::eefd36e84882ad068fa3aa2dbbb68f25
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2014, pp.571-590. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007⟩
Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 571-590. Elsevier Science
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2014, pp.571-590. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007⟩
Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 571-590. Elsevier Science
International audience; We analyse the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5fd42c4620fe70386995b83a3138b279
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007
Autor:
Kirill Chernomaz, Johanna M. M. Goertz
Publikováno v:
Games
Volume 10
Issue 2
Games, Vol 10, Iss 2, p 20 (2019)
Volume 10
Issue 2
Games, Vol 10, Iss 2, p 20 (2019)
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::25c5e99618a3f18e8ceb65db84d8982a
https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020020
https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020020
Akademický článek
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