Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"democratic constitutions"'
Autor:
Puskar R. Joshi, Zohreh R. Eslami
Publikováno v:
Cogent Education, Vol 11, Iss 1 (2024)
Despite Nepal’s huge linguistic diversity, maintaining minority languages and providing the mother tongue-based education to non-dominant language children are Nepal’s two major obstacles. Scholars have pointed to a negative consequence of the st
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/be908e0dd0c44d008e91b1323a1082d8
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Veit Bader
Publikováno v:
Utrecht Law Review, Vol 6, Iss 3, Pp 8-35 (2010)
In recent debates on the constitutional status of 'secularism' we can discern three positions. The first tries to overcome the absence of 'secularism' in most liberal-democratic constitutions by developing a more robust theory of constitutional secul
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/01661eab4b084aacba7dac21160fa18a
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal. 120:1-39
We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in a n unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a rela
Autor:
AKTAŞ, Hasan Emir
Publikováno v:
Volume: XVII, Issue: 3-4 1-25
Erzincan Binali Yıldırım Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi
Erzincan Binali Yıldırım Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi
Din ve inanç hürriyetinin anayasal düzeyde teminat altına alınması, fert ve toplum hayatının ruhi selameti ve sosyal barışı açısından fevkalade ehemmiyetlidir. Çağdaş demokratik toplumlar, din ve inanç hürriyetini vicdan, ifade ve
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=tubitakulakb::a2602b17a4ca02e1c36aae23f35f0e77
https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ebyuhfd/issue/62929/954962
https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ebyuhfd/issue/62929/954962
Autor:
Hans Gersbach
Publikováno v:
Economics : the Open-Access, Open-Assessment e-Journal (2007)
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal, 3 (1)
Economics : the Open-Access, Open-Assessment e-Journal (2009)
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal, 3 (1)
Economics : the Open-Access, Open-Assessment e-Journal (2009)
The author proposes a two-round process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first round, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first round is r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dafe448f00d1e17f34aa6f06f22b0f36
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-20
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-20
Autor:
Gersbach, Hans
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We develop democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules can yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and doub
Autor:
Gersbach, Hans
In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::c7ff52cbe97f942e0aecb1c7f91d1460
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740
Autor:
Hans Gersbach
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first