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pro vyhledávání: '"de Keijzer, Bart"'
We study the exploration-exploitation trade-off for large multiplayer coordination games where players strategise via Q-Learning, a common learning framework in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Q-Learning is known to have two shortcomings, namely
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.15461
Bounded rationality in mechanism design aims to ensure incentive-compatibility for agents who are cognitively limited. These agents lack the contingent reasoning skills that traditional mechanism design assumes, and depending on how these cognitive l
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08314
Financial networks raise a significant computational challenge in identifying insolvent firms and evaluating their exposure to systemic risk. This task, known as the clearing problem, is computationally tractable when dealing with simple debt contrac
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.05139
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational agents to b
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.06660
Financial networks model a set of financial institutions (firms) interconnected by obligations. Recent work has introduced to this model a class of obligations called credit default swaps, a certain kind of financial derivatives. The main computation
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2109.06608
Autor:
de Keijzer, Bart, Wojtczak, Dominik
We consider a multi-stage facility reallocation problems on the real line, where a facility is being moved between time stages based on the locations reported by $n$ agents. The aim of the reallocation algorithm is to minimise the social cost, i.e.,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.12894
Publikováno v:
In Theoretical Computer Science 26 June 2023 963
Autor:
Gerstgrasser, Matthias, Goldberg, Paul W., de Keijzer, Bart, Lazos, Philip, Skopalik, Alexander
We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a si
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1811.05130
Autor:
Janus, Tomasz, de Keijzer, Bart
We study strong equilibria in network creation games. These form a classical and well-studied class of games where a set of players form a network by buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of a fixed parameter $\alpha$. The cost of a player is def
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.03466
Autor:
Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo, Goldberg, Paul, de Keijzer, Bart, Leonardi, Stefano, Turchetta, Stefano
Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these agents, if
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08394