Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"carlo capuano"'
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 13, Iss 1, p 8 (2021)
White Lists are lists of firms set up at each Italian prefecture. It is a relatively young instrument born as an experimental project designed to solve problems for particular conditions of crime and corruption in the Italian territory. This work aim
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a02ebf3541d44d3eaa08b56ab51a3786
Autor:
Carlo Capuano, Iacopo Grassi
Publikováno v:
Economics of Innovation and New Technology. 31:539-551
In this paper, we evaluate the private incentive to cooperate comparing three different scenarios (R&D cooperation, and R&D competition with and without licensing), in terms of expected profits, industry probability of innovation, and expected welfar
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::373f2cbe40ef5097e66ede3e8cf75324
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2020.1841941
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2020.1841941
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 130:109-131
In a context of imperfect patent protection, this paper analyses the strategic use of patents from a novel perspective; patents are seen as a means available to the incumbent firm to control entry and, more importantly, to influence the post-entry ma
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::44e8553bc1e576fdfd2d2ab4ef52ea3e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00685-5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-019-00685-5
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2b3ea963b75695e934448c442059f39f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4022046
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4022046
Autor:
Carlo Capuano, Iacopo Grassi
This article analyzes the ways in which imperfect patent protection affects patent holders’ licensing decisions, firms’ willingness to pay for the innovation, and social welfare. We consider a cost-reducing innovation by either an incumbent or a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ccf9839c4b280e8388c71d639193aa65
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/777081
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/777081
Autor:
Iacopo Grassi, Carlo Capuano
Publikováno v:
Economics of Innovation and New Technology. 28:197-216
We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competiti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3d20950a8e96a2ffb7bdbe6a6a8d7be6
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2018.1461333
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2018.1461333
Publikováno v:
STUDI ECONOMICI. :251-270
L’industria orafa ha una lunga tradizione ed un ruolo importante per l’economia italiana. Il settore è organizzato secondo la configurazione produttiva del distretto industriale. Con riferimento al distretto orafo campano, il presente lavoro ha
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e4aceac02b9cad34e634f1f0759ce8e5
https://doi.org/10.3280/ste2016-118015
https://doi.org/10.3280/ste2016-118015
Autor:
carlo capuano, iacopo grassi
We analyze the sustainability of collusion in a supergames framework wherein the only input is a highly qualified type of labor, with its supply being upward-sloping and the wage being sensitive to the industry input demand. Hence, when seeking to ex
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3730::db8c67be68a220a203d25f95e503e5e7
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/747439
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/747439
We extend the literature on licensing, introducing imperfect patent protection. We present a theoretical model where an innovator may license a more efficient technology to an incumbent. Because of imperfect patent protection, the incumbent may imita
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3730::842540869710d83f9bacdabdb99e32ad
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/760691
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/760691
Autor:
Iacopo Grassi, Carlo Capuano
The paper analyzes an entry game where, in the presence of imperfect patent protection, a patent holder of a costreducing innovation can propose either an exclusive license, that preserves the incumbent's monopolistic position, or a sole license, com
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3730::bccce400d5d9048a1d8cbc04476e1d97
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/777592
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/777592