Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 45
pro vyhledávání: '"c92 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 197, 624-642. Elsevier Science
When people with different normative beliefs interact, moral opportunism-or the tendency to follow the norm that brings the highest material benefit-can arise. Our conjecture is that this behavior is a consequence of expected norm-dependent utility m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3d7ec0e83df7fdfb5712119620d860a1
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/15c916be-e30e-4b9d-85ec-543c072863c4
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/15c916be-e30e-4b9d-85ec-543c072863c4
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178, 313-326. Elsevier Science
We study the intrinsic incentives that drive behavior in redistributive institutions with various levels of enforcement. We are interested in how the opportunistic incentive to use a redistributive institution for personal gain and the desire to foll
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::861d057f91688f61eff22ae1c5b9aad0
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.07.031
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.07.031
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 109-130. Elsevier Science
The widespread use of employee referrals raises questions regarding how they affect labor market outcomes. Does referral hiring lead to a more efficient allocation of workers compared to when hiring is possible only on a competitive market? To utiliz
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1f153c244bfdb9994b32a4026db6dbe2
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6165ccc0-faee-491e-a6c9-97826026f396
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6165ccc0-faee-491e-a6c9-97826026f396
Autor:
Arno Riedl, Jordi Brandts
Publikováno v:
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname
European Economic Review, 121:103318. Elsevier Science
instname
European Economic Review, 121:103318. Elsevier Science
Trabajo presentado en los KTI International seminar series organizados por el Centre for Economic and Regional Studies de la Hungarian Academy of Sciences, durante el 15 de junio de 2017
We experimentally study the effects of different types of
We experimentally study the effects of different types of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4c500ddb22e855408e95ab999186f5f3
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103318
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103318
Publikováno v:
Applied Economics Letters, 24(1), 54-57. Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group
we experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::49c85fab671b928e1df0715cf0b13ec0
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6ab10604-58c2-45f9-89d1-98c41d2bddec
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6ab10604-58c2-45f9-89d1-98c41d2bddec
This paper experimentally investigates excessive risk taking in contest schemes by implementing a novel stopping task based on Seel and Strack (2013). In this stylized setting, managers with contest payoffs have an incentive to delay halting projects
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::cddf5a4438c66f3ebe18e9d059e240af
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f60fe536-5a9a-4812-8ff9-2c3af523f042
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f60fe536-5a9a-4812-8ff9-2c3af523f042
This paper experimentally investigates excessive risk taking in contest schemes by implementing a novel stopping task based on Seel and Strack (2013). In this stylized setting, managers with contest payoffs have an incentive to delay halting projects
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::0101ecd2b99ca69546d4578975fb00b2
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2020025
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2020025
This paper experimentally investigates excessive risk taking in contest schemes by implementing a novel stopping task based on Seel and Strack (2013). In this stylized setting, managers with contest payoffs have an incentive to delay halting projects
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od________83::65ba75316990ece26c75939e9f8ec701
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f60fe536-5a9a-4812-8ff9-2c3af523f042
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f60fe536-5a9a-4812-8ff9-2c3af523f042
Knowing that some action is possible in principle, even if not available, could affect behaviour. This may happen because a game is perceived as part of a larger game or ‘metacontext’ that includes its outcomes as a proper subset. In an experimen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::cd0af7f6b30c51720f8cf4874098aac6
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/7cf9f330-cb46-4652-96b8-17439d737270
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/7cf9f330-cb46-4652-96b8-17439d737270
There are two theoretically parallel ways in which principals can manipulate agents’ choices: with monetary incentives (mechanism design) or Bayesian persuasion (information design). We are interested in whether incentives or persuasion is a better
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::3b0caf180f9361db32a9e909f7128ba8
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/7b4f5035-1726-4ce8-844a-c479ca357da3
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/7b4f5035-1726-4ce8-844a-c479ca357da3