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pro vyhledávání: '"Zhuoqiong Chen"'
Autor:
Zhuoqiong Chen
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 25:33-64
We study all-pay auctions where each player observes her private value as well as a noisy private signal about the opponent’s value, following Fang and Morris’s (J Econ Theory 126(1):1–30, 2006) analysis of winner-pay auctions with multidimensi
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Psychology. 93:102551
We study how salient group identity, created through competition between students from different universities, as well as differences in the value of winning impact competitive behavior. Our experiment employs a simple all-pay auction within and betw
Autor:
Linqing You, Zhuoqiong Chen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Banking & Finance. 145:106640
When experience goods compete, consuming one product can be informative about value for similar untried products. We study a two-period model of duopoly competition in markets that have this feature and where firms can price discriminate between cons
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::895bbe8ddc176f0bc0ca219445c88023
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28584
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28584
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Marcus Roel, Zhuoqiong Chen
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We explore how and when crises can help firms, organizations, and societies undertake beneficial reforms. In our model, a loss averse decision maker decides whether she should undertake a new project (a reform), characterized by a sequence of cash-fl
Autor:
Zhuoqiong Chen
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about the players’ values facilitates the exchange of information by di
Autor:
Zhuoqiong Chen
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Two players compete for a prize in an all-pay auction where their private binary valuations are independent from each other. A contest organizer commits to disclose additional information about the opponent’s valuation to each player – privately
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 137:226-229
We design an all-pay auction experiment in which we reveal the gender of the opponent. Using this design, we find that women bid higher than men, but only when bidding against other women. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model incor
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We extend previous theoretical work on n-players complete information all-pay auction to incorporate heterogeneous risk and loss averse utility functions. We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with a given set