Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 53
pro vyhledávání: '"Zhang, Jiazi"'
Autor:
Thatte, Amogh A., Dalvi, Sourabh, Carag, Vincent, Zhang, Jiazi, Jorgenson, Jennie, Guerra, Omar J.
This study addresses the challenges in optimizing long-duration energy storage (LDES) dispatch within future power systems featuring high integration of variable renewable energy (VRE). The research focuses on conducting a comparative analysis betwee
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.11379
Autor:
Brown, Patrick R., Barrows, Clayton P., Wright, Jarrad G., Brinkman, Gregory L., Dalvi, Sourabh, Zhang, Jiazi, Mai, Trieu
Capacity expansion models for the electric power system often employ zonal (rather than nodal) resolution, necessitating estimates of aggregate power transfer limits across the interfaces between model zones. Interface limits between planning areas a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.03612
Autor:
Chu, Zhigang, Pinceti, Andrea, Kaviani, Ramin, Khodadadeh, Roozbeh, Li, Xingpeng, Zhang, Jiazi, Saikumar, Karthik, Sahraei-Ardakani, Mostafa, Mosier, Christopher, Podmore, Robin, Hedman, Kory, Kosut, Oliver, Sankar, Lalitha
In this paper, we investigate the feasibility and physical consequences of cyber attacks against energy management systems (EMS). Within this framework, we have designed a complete simulation platform to emulate realistic EMS operations: it includes
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2104.13908
$N-1$ Reliability Makes It Difficult for False Data Injection Attacks to Cause Physical Consequences
This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained econom
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07699
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to determine the w
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1903.07781
This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions unde
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1806.05057
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to determine the w
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.04218
This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.02038
Publikováno v:
J. Zhang, Z. Chu, L. Sankar and O. Kosut, "Can Attackers with Limited Information Exploit Historical Data to Mount Successful False Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems?," in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2018
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being detected vi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.07500
Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack is chosen
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.06557