Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Zéphirin Nganmeni"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 24:1101-1123
In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this ques
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fbb10cdae8800a4aa2313ff082569b55
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12590
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12590
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 190:301-316
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty when more than one positional dimension is modeled. In the general set
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e8ce6ce4458f06a11feff910eef51468
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00936-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00936-4
Autor:
Zéphirin Nganmeni, Mathieu Martin
Publikováno v:
Operations Research Letters. 48:336-341
Introduced by Saari and Asay (2010), the “finesse point” extends the notion of core. Its definition is similar to the finagle point. Unlike the finagle point, there is a relatively simple geometrical construction of finesse point. In this note, w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::45ec85b8ca2caceab91e893a84bc84ab
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.013
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.03.013
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 89:10-19
Spatial games take into account the position of any voter in the space. In this class of games, two main indices of political power were defined. The first by Owen (1971) and the second, by Shapley (1977), later on extended in a two-dimensional space
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6a81673bc159ff00604f570de442f915
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.05.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.05.003
Autor:
Mathieu Martin, Zéphirin Nganmeni
Publikováno v:
Operations Research Letters
Operations Research Letters, Elsevier, 2019, 47, pp.502-506. ⟨10.1016/j.orl.2019.08.007⟩
Operations Research Letters, Elsevier, 2019, 47, pp.502-506. ⟨10.1016/j.orl.2019.08.007⟩
In this note, we focus on a result stated by Brauninger that the finagle point is within the ϵ -core in a spatial voting game with Euclidean individual preferences. Through a counter-example with 7 players, we show that Brauninger’s result is not
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3850d174962635bf1cd839a2801322e7
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03487283
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03487283
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 47:511-518
The yolk, an important concept of spatial majority voting theory, is assumed to be unique when the number of individuals is odd. We prove that this claim is true in $$ {\mathbb {R}} ^{2}$$ but false in $$ {\mathbb {R}} ^{3}$$ , and discuss the differ
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::89b7116836d6572fce2e42bd7803b9f0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0979-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0979-7
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2017, 86, pp.9-17. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, 86, pp.9-17. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2017, 86, pp.9-17. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, 86, pp.9-17. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003⟩
International audience; This work focuses on the evaluation of voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure. Dichotomous multi-type games, introduced by Courtin et al. [2016], model games in which there is a number
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0086bb258d0e70213ec4d5ce7f1de85f
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01545772
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01545772
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2016, 81 (3), pp.413-426. ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4⟩
Theory and Decision, 2016, 81 (3), pp.413-426. ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4⟩
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2016, 81 (3), pp.413-426. ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4⟩
Theory and Decision, 2016, 81 (3), pp.413-426. ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4⟩
International audience; This work focuses on multi-type games in which there are a number of non-ordered types in the input, while the output consists of a single real value. When considering the dichotomous case, we extend the Shapley-Shubik power i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::59414eebe666e473e9b5eb88aefb0a4a
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01545769/document
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01545769/document