Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 13
pro vyhledávání: '"Yutaro Murakami"'
Publikováno v:
ACS Applied Electronic Materials. 4:6364-6372
Publikováno v:
同志社商学 = Doshisha Shogaku (The Doshisha Business Review). 73(1):81-114
研究(Article)
Autor:
Taichi Kimura, Yutaro Murakami
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
ACS Applied Materials & Interfaces. 11:27057-27063
Single-crystal SnSe exhibits extremely high thermoelectric properties, and fabrication of SnSe films is promising for practical application and basic research on properties. However, the high thermoelectric properties have not yet been reported in Sn
Autor:
Atsushi Shiiba, Yutaro Murakami
Publikováno v:
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance. :0148558X2110362
This paper considers how a manager decides to disclose or withhold segment information in a capital market setting. In particular, we develop a multi-period model in which a manager in each period decides how to allocate her effort between two busine
Publikováno v:
Transactions of Japan Society of Kansei Engineering. 13:341-346
Autor:
Yutaro Murakami, Atsushi Shiiba
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper considers how a manager decides to disclose or withhold segment information in a capital market setting. In particular, we develop a multi-period model in which a manager in each period decides how to allocate her effort between two busine
Autor:
Yutaro Murakami, Satoshi Taguchi
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The purpose of this study is to experimentally investigate an analytical model of tax compliance, assuming a game-theoretic situation between a taxpayer and a tax auditor. Specifically, we focus on the following three research questions. First, would
Autor:
Yutaro Murakami
Publikováno v:
Economics Bulletin. 8(12):1-10
This paper constructs a multi-region endogenous growth model with productive government spending to examine vertical intergovernmental relationship. Specifically, we analyze the contribution of fiscal decentralization on the optimal tax rates of nati
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper, we investigate an aggressive accounting system with hidden action. We present a five-stage game. In this model, the agent can choose an accounting system and his/her effort level before he sees his signal and payoff realized. The basic