Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Yuliy Sannikov"'
Autor:
Yuliy Sannikov, Sebastian Di Tella
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 89:1099-1139
We study the role of hidden savings in optimal contracts for delegated asset management. The principal uses the agent's access to capital to manipulate his precautionary motive and reduce the cost of providing incentives. After bad outcomes, the agen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::93d72951fc9d6c3a9a8f9e1fcb5d99bc
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14929
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14929
Autor:
Saki Bigio, Yuliy Sannikov
This paper integrates a realistic implementation of monetary policy through the banking system into an incomplete-markets economy with wage rigidity. Monetary policy sets policy rates and alters the supply of reserves. These tools grant independent c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::09b714b38137c67385d7b07e6f84823a
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28540
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28540
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::904936cc6d111b73adfe800056bc436b
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4007782
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4007782
This paper incorporates a bubble term in the standard FTPL equation to explain why countries with persistently negative primary surpluses can have a positively valued currency and low inflation. It also provides an example with closed-form solutions
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::83ed39ec5cb273ba34a521ea7b254e14
https://doi.org/10.3386/w27116
https://doi.org/10.3386/w27116
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6c85d31c1b976a6dd92f2b4aa4efb4d3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598764
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598764
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5ca5d4e78fecf1c2aa118031729c8ce2
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3597848
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3597848
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria of stochastic games with perfect monitoring, geometric discounting, and public randomization. We develop novel algorithms for computing equilibrium payoffs, in which we combine policy ite
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8cd3ffa9638f323d8b853d9f8beb385c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3389053
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3389053
Autor:
Peter M. DeMarzo, Yuliy Sannikov
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 84:182-236
We study a principal–agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the pr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c9da4cdaefec7ed945377d3d91a44893
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw029
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw029