Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Yuanchuan Lien"'
Autor:
Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 11:41-52
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be per
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b853bda84027189c2dc6962e43632bc1
https://doi.org/10.3982/te1198
https://doi.org/10.3982/te1198
Autor:
Yuanchuan Lien, Jacob K. Goeree
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 153:506-533
We provide a Bayes–Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items. We first assume that each local bidder valu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::986c1017da45409ea81723d85763d953
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.014
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.014
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 85:210-231
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously untested class of value profiles in which synergies arise from shared fixed costs. We find that, in many cases, a simulator that bids straightforwardly do
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1f299586fd9f7ab6638b444c62d3aef7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.006
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6132c05a6d347053ca2cef28647e9c79
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-171406252
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-171406252
Autor:
Yuanchuan Lien, Jacob K. Goeree
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be per
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::efd5c9653367f7ac68ae352ea673ead6
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1506984
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1506984
Autor:
Jacob K. Goeree, Yuanchuan Lien
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal
We analyze the dynamic simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which was pioneered by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1994 and has since become the standard to conduct large-scale, large-stakes spectrum auctions around the world. We c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::149aa5a79a2d97e4be592ba9c7e03527
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1476837
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1476837
Autor:
Ward Hanson, Daniel R. Vincent, John P. Hayes, Yeon-Koo Che, Robert E. Hall, Vijay Krishna, Kenneth J. Arrow, Shane Greenstein, Thomas M. Lenard, Timothy J. Brennan, Gregory S. Crawford, Charles R. Plott, David McAdams, William Lehr, Bruce M. Owen, John H. Kagel, Kenneth Hendricks, Marius Schwartz, Ian Gale, Peter M. DeMarzo, Jonathan Levin, Gregory L. Rosston, James Alleman, Heather Hudson, Susan Athey, Joel Waldfogel, Janice Alane Hauge, Peter Cramton, William J. Baumol, Jeremy Bulow, John W. Mayo, Alfred E. Kahn, Scott J. Savage, Bradley S. Wimmer, Barry C Harris, Coleman Bazelon, Vernon L. Smith, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Mark A Jamison, Jonathan B. Baker, Lixin Ye, Jacob K. Goeree, Philip J. Reny, William Samuelson, Jeremy T. Fox, Paul Milgrom, Daniel A. Ackerberg, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Roger G. Noll, Ilan Kremer, Brent Goldfarb, Robert H. Porter, Thomas W. Hazlett, Robert W. Hahn, Robert J. Weber, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Glenn A. Woroch, Michael H. Riordan, David Salant, Scott Wallsten, Yuanchuan Lien, Richard Schmalensee, Robert G. Harris, Jerry A. Hausman
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spendi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::43a32707bdf1f001c9726f2eeb1b5e6f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1377523
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1377523