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pro vyhledávání: '"Youngsub Chun"'
Autor:
Youngsub Chun
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol 6, Iss 1, Pp 37-58 (2021)
We consider 2-person bargaining situations in which the feasible set is known, but the disagreement point is uncertain. We investigate the implications of various axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points and characterize the family of linear s
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/48688762424c48b5bd8f51f36c37a1eb
Publikováno v:
van den Brink, R, Chun, Y, Funaki, Y & Zou, Z 2023, ' Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions ', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 307, no. 2, pp. 975-983 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.10.017
European Journal of Operational Research, 307(2), 975-983. Elsevier
European Journal of Operational Research, 307(2), 975-983. Elsevier
In this paper, we study the implications of extending the balanced cost reduction property from queueing problems to general games. As a direct translation of the balanced cost reduction property, the axiom of balanced externalities for solutions of
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 18(1):38-49
We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 57(1), 35-62. Springer New York
Zou, Z, van den Brink, R, Chun, Y & Funaki, Y 2021, ' Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 35-62 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01299-3
Zou, Z, van den Brink, R, Chun, Y & Funaki, Y 2021, ' Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 35-62 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01299-3
We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of the players. First, a new proportionality principle, called proporti
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 18:3-5
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 18:77-91
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 60:35-46
For sequencing problems, we identify the set of all mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency, strategy-proofness and budget balance. Such mechanisms are balanced VCG (or B-VCG) mechanisms up to an agent specific function that does not depend on the wai
Autor:
Youngsub Chun
Publikováno v:
Homo Oeconomicus. 37:59-65
We investigate the existence of solutions satisfying converse consistency together with other well-known axioms in the context of bargaining. Our results are negative. First, we show that there is no solution satisfying converse consistency together
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 72:1-19
Recent developments in immunosuppressive protocols have enabled patients to receive kidney transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose to use immunosuppressants as a part of kidney exchange program. We introduce the “pairwise cycl
Autor:
Youngsub Chun, Duygu Yengin
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 88:87-97
Given a group of agents, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we characterize interesting subfamilies of the VCG mechanisms by investigating the implic