Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Yingni Guo"'
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies.
This article develops a model to explore how favour exchange influences wealth dynamics. We identify a key obstacle to wealth accumulation: wealth crowds out favour exchange. Therefore, households must choose between growing their wealth and accessin
Autor:
Eran Shmaya, Yingni Guo
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 87:653-675
A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff‐relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the quality, referred to as his type. We show that the sender‐optimal mechanism takes the form
Autor:
Qiong Zhou, Yingni Guo, Dennis P. McDaniel, Clara C. Lowe, Alison A. Chomiak, Hongna Pan, Yuanyi Feng, Martin L. Doughty, Xiaoming Zhou
Publikováno v:
iScience. 25:104354
SUMMARYTheNDE1gene encodes a scaffold protein essential for brain development. While biallelicNDE1loss of function (LOF) causes microcephaly with profound mental retardation,NDE1missense mutations and copy number variations are associated with multip
Autor:
Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya
We consider a platform that provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equil
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bdbc492268933057f20a76b433a6b156
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253509
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253509
Autor:
YINGNI GUO1 yingni.guo@northwestern.edu
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. Aug2016, Vol. 106 Issue 8, p1969-2008. 40p. 7 Diagrams, 4 Graphs.
Autor:
Yingni Guo, Arjada Bardhi
A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two pe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b43a51905004b0a744fd39bd1f1645f1
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197173
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197173
Autor:
Yingni Guo, Johannes Hörner
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The designer uses future allocation decisions as a way of eliciting private information. Values evolve according to a two-state Markov chain. We solve for the optimal al
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8343f1a48c2a7ff1a4c75623494a2d32
http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1985.pdf
http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1985.pdf