Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Yaron Azrieli"'
Autor:
Yaron Azrieli
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 12, Iss 1, p 3 (2021)
The rational inattention literature is split between two versions of the model: in one, mutual information of states and signals are bounded by a hard constraint, while, in the other, it appears as an additive term in the decision maker’s utility f
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/85bb210223ea4486a702cfd14a9627c3
Autor:
Yaron Azrieli
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 132:240-254
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9bbe86f7cd180bf211210ef6e2f4fd12
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics. 23:1-29
Azrieli et al. (J Polit Econ, 2018) provide a characterization of incentive compatible payment mechanisms for experiments, assuming subjects’ preferences respect dominance but can have any possible subjective beliefs over random outcomes. If instea
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::936476f1d5f987bf376b6c0f5140d615
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09607-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09607-0
A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into “types,” and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::26bc389b4eab4b92d7d0615d3793045f
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253527
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253527
Autor:
Yaron Azrieli, Dan Levin
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 69:337-365
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4ef2cb3ea6ab39af0420f79a820f3012
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1165-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1165-1
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 126:1472-1503
Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise mo...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8ee73157ed1f12126d3137ee67a95de3
https://doi.org/10.1086/698136
https://doi.org/10.1086/698136
Autor:
Yaron Azrieli, Ritesh Jain
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 74:108-118
Designers of economic mechanisms can often benefit by using discriminatory mechanisms which treat agents asymmetrically. This paper studies the extent to which a policy prohibiting biased mechanisms is effective in achieving fair outcomes. Our main r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4ed29760bd2efbb80c05d31d38dae42f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.007
Autor:
Yaron Azrieli
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 50:353-385
I study the design of binary voting rules in environments where agents are heterogenous either in the stakes that they have in the decision or in the quality of information they possess regarding the correct course of action. The price of ‘one pers
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dc2a6327c24176312b91a54479712f97
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1087-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1087-z
Autor:
Semin Kim, Yaron Azrieli
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 55:1067-1088
We consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives, independent private values and no monetary transfers. The utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule, where agents' wei
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::557eb22721b726b16f67884c687d9226
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12083
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12083
Autor:
Yaron Azrieli
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 82:415-423
Say that one information structure is eventually Blackwell sufficient for another if, for every large enough n, an n-sample from the first is Blackwell sufficient (Blackwell (1951, 1954)) for an n-sample from the second. This note shows that eventual
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::462e526958aca09e82b655e427fa6d30
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11127
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11127