Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Yangguang Huang"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 68:6059-6074
Many innovative products are designed to satisfy the demand of specific target consumers; thus, the innovators will inevitably compete with each other in the product market. We investigate how a profit-maximizing principal should properly allocate he
Autor:
Yangguang Huang, Yu Xie
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 88:102933
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Ming He, Yangguang Huang
Publikováno v:
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
We study the econometrics of an asymmetric Tullock contest model with incomplete information. Identification results are established for parameters in the asymmetric contest success function and for the quantile functions of players' private costs. W
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3edffa3df6f36096f2e419901c402bca
https://hdl.handle.net/10453/156682
https://hdl.handle.net/10453/156682
Autor:
Jijun Xia, Yangguang Huang
Publikováno v:
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
In procurement, quality manipulation corruption arises when the agent tasked with quality evaluation exaggerates the quality of a corrupt firm. If an inefficient firm is favored by the agent, the buyer can adjust the procurement mechanism such that t
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Many innovative products are designed to satisfy the demand of specific target consumers, and thus innovators with new products will inevitably compete with each other in the post-innovation market. We investigate how a profit-maximizing principal sh
Autor:
Yangguang Huang, Quan Wen
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 60:355-385
This article studies an auction–lottery hybrid mechanism that is widely adopted in allocating new vehicle licenses in China. We characterize individuals' entry and bidding strategies in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, structurally estimate i