Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"Yaglikci, Abdullah Giray"'
Autor:
Yağlıkçı, Abdullah Giray
Increasing storage density exacerbates DRAM read disturbance, a circuit-level vulnerability exploited by system-level attacks. Unfortunately, existing defenses are either ineffective or prohibitively expensive. Efficient mitigation is critical to ens
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.15044
Autor:
Oliveira, Geraldo F., Olgun, Ataberk, Yağlıkçı, Abdullah Giray, Bostancı, F. Nisa, Gómez-Luna, Juan, Ghose, Saugata, Mutlu, Onur
Processing-using-DRAM (PUD) is a processing-in-memory (PIM) approach that uses a DRAM array's massive internal parallelism to execute very-wide data-parallel operations, in a single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) fashion. However, DRAM rows' large
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.19080
Autor:
Yağlıkçı, Abdullah Giray, Tuğrul, Yahya Can, Oliveira, Geraldo F., Yüksel, İsmail Emir, Olgun, Ataberk, Luo, Haocong, Mutlu, Onur
Read disturbance in modern DRAM chips is a widespread phenomenon and is reliably used for breaking memory isolation, a fundamental building block for building robust systems. RowHammer and RowPress are two examples of read disturbance in DRAM where r
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.18652
Autor:
Patel, Minesh, Shahroodi, Taha, Manglik, Aditya, Yağlıkçı, Abdullah Giray, Olgun, Ataberk, Luo, Haocong, Mutlu, Onur
Generational improvements to commodity DRAM throughout half a century have long solidified its prevalence as main memory across the computing industry. However, overcoming today's DRAM technology scaling challenges requires new solutions driven by bo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16279
Autor:
Yuksel, Ismail Emir, Tugrul, Yahya Can, Bostanci, F. Nisa, Yaglikci, Abdullah Giray, Olgun, Ataberk, Oliveira, Geraldo F., Soysal, Melina, Luo, Haocong, Luna, Juan Gomez, Sadrosadati, Mohammad, Mutlu, Onur
Data movement between the processor and the main memory is a first-order obstacle against improving performance and energy efficiency in modern systems. To address this obstacle, Processing-using-Memory (PuM) is a promising approach where bulk-bitwis
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.02880
Autor:
Olgun, Ataberk, Osseiran, Majd, Yaglikci, Abdullah Giray, Tugrul, Yahya Can, Luo, Haocong, Rhyner, Steve, Salami, Behzad, Luna, Juan Gomez, Mutlu, Onur
We experimentally demonstrate the effects of read disturbance (RowHammer and RowPress) and uncover the inner workings of undocumented read disturbance defense mechanisms in High Bandwidth Memory (HBM). Detailed characterization of six real HBM2 DRAM
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.14665
Autor:
Olgun, Ataberk, Tugrul, Yahya Can, Bostanci, Nisa, Yuksel, Ismail Emir, Luo, Haocong, Rhyner, Steve, Yaglikci, Abdullah Giray, Oliveira, Geraldo F., Mutlu, Onur
We introduce ABACuS, a new low-cost hardware-counter-based RowHammer mitigation technique that performance-, energy-, and area-efficiently scales with worsening RowHammer vulnerability. We observe that both benign workloads and RowHammer attacks tend
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.09977
Autor:
Yağlıkçı, Abdullah Giray, Olgun, Ataberk, Patel, Minesh, Luo, Haocong, Hassan, Hasan, Orosa, Lois, Ergin, Oğuz, Mutlu, Onur
DRAM is the building block of modern main memory systems. DRAM cells must be periodically refreshed to prevent data loss. Refresh operations degrade system performance by interfering with memory accesses. As DRAM chip density increases with technolog
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.10198
Autor:
Orosa, Lois, Yağlıkçı, Abdullah Giray, Luo, Haocong, Olgun, Ataberk, Park, Jisung, Hassan, Hasan, Patel, Minesh, Kim, Jeremie S., Mutlu, Onur
RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability where repeatedly accessing (i.e., hammering) a DRAM row can cause bit flips in physically nearby rows. The RowHammer vulnerability worsens as DRAM cell size and cell-to-cell spacing shrink. Recent studi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.10291
The purpose of this document is to study the security properties of the Silver Bullet algorithm against worst-case RowHammer attacks. We mathematically demonstrate that Silver Bullet, when properly configured and implemented in a DRAM chip, can secur
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07084