Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 138
pro vyhledávání: '"YEON-KOO CHE"'
Autor:
Yeon-Koo Che, Ian Gale
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 95-118 (2006)
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One applicati
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d7a708ffe4f74b1c90764513b6cfcf73
Autor:
Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
Publikováno v:
EC
We study the optimal design of a queueing system when agents' arrival and servicing are governed by a general Markov process. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit rules for agents, their service priority---or queueing discipline---as wel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0d409144c4d8966dd11815c49713984
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ae9029be1c90b27155b2bf49bb20b3b4
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4309000
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4309000
Autor:
YEON-KOO CHE1 yeonkooche@gmail.com, MIERENDORFF, KONRAD2 k.mierendorff@ucl.ac.uk
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. Aug2019, Vol. 109 Issue 8, p2993-3029. 37p.
Autor:
Yeon-Koo Che, Weijie Zhong
Publikováno v:
EC
We study robustly-optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of robustly-
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b9b9a0f14c30349d4fd070789a61f883
https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467570
https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467570
Autor:
Konrad Mierendorff, Yeon-Koo Che
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 109:2993-3029
We consider a decision maker (DM) who, before taking an action, seeks information by allocating her limited attention dynamically over different news sources that are biased toward alternative actions. Endogenous choice of information generates rich
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0f2a17c48632317b1221fe70537368f2
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171000
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171000
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 87:65-110
We study stability of two‐sided many‐to‐one matching in which firms' preferences for workers may exhibit complementarities. Although such preferences are known to jeopardize stability in a finite market, we show that a stable matching exists in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8b1bba82b1b12614a11ae8abba2561f8
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13547
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13547
Autor:
József Sákovics, Yeon-Koo Che
Publikováno v:
Sakovics, J & Che, Y-K 2020, ' To trade, or not to trade, that is the question : New roles for incomplete contracts in dynamic settings ', Journal of European Economic Association, vol. N/A, pp. 1-35 . https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa035
We reexamine the role of incomplete contracts in a dynamic model of renegotiation that endogenizes the timing of investments and trade. The interaction between bargaining and investment significantly alters the lessons learned from static models. Whe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::136767531b9bef98e6666695423313c6
https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/154305784/Jeeafinal.pdf
https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/154305784/Jeeafinal.pdf
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a M
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7acdd2cfbf56dc0607d6f2bbfe2a37b8
http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07338
http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07338
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review: Insights
American Economic Review: Insights, 2020, 2 (4), pp.425-441. ⟨10.1257/aeri.20190307⟩
American Economic Review: Insights, 2020, 2 (4), pp.425-441. ⟨10.1257/aeri.20190307⟩
Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::65f2fe6c79e282c344862fe8192ce25b
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03029897
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03029897