Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Xingtang Wang"'
Autor:
Xingtang Wang
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 119:91-96
Autor:
Xingtang Wang
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 44:608-618
Autor:
Xingtang Wang, Leonard F. S. Wang
Publikováno v:
Metroeconomica.
Autor:
Xingtang Wang, Leonard F.S. Wang
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 43:1764-1772
Autor:
Xingtang Wang, Leonard F.S. Wang
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 113:149-159
In this paper, we analyze the influence of the delegation of downstream firms that produce different quality of products on the profits, consumer surplus and social welfare in a vertically related market. We find that whether it is price or quantity
Autor:
Lin Zhang, Xingtang Wang
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 26:75-86
This paper reconsiders the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare in a vertical market. The results indicate that monopolistic downstream third-degree price discrimination increases social welfare when the input price is
Autor:
Leonard F.S. Wang, Xingtang Wang
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 18:402-417
Autor:
Leonard F.S. Wang, Xingtang Wang
Publikováno v:
The Japanese Economic Review. 73:403-425
In this paper, we consider that the public firm competes with a private firm caring about consumer surplus in vertically differentiated market. We explore the privatization policy, and the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and
Publikováno v:
Review of International Economics. 27:1108-1125
Would a foreign firm’s consumer‐oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country’s voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import‐competing duopoly model with ve
Autor:
Jie Li, Xingtang Wang
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 131:61-75
We analyze the effect of downstream competition (or cooperation) in the presence of decentralized bargaining between two downstream firms and an upstream monopolist over a two-part tariff input price. The major findings are as follows: (i) the relati