Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 266
pro vyhledávání: '"Xia, Lirong"'
Autor:
Kavner, Joshua, Xia, Lirong
Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of iterative plurality on t
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08144
Autor:
Kang, Inwon, Ruan, Sikai, Ho, Tyler, Lin, Jui-Chien, Mohsin, Farhad, Seneviratne, Oshani, Xia, Lirong
Finding preferences expressed in natural language is an important but challenging task. State-of-the-art(SotA) methods leverage transformer-based models such as BERT, RoBERTa, etc. and graph neural architectures such as graph attention networks. Sinc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.08523
An important question in elections is the determine whether a candidate can be a winner when some votes are absent. We study this determining winner with the absent votes (WAV) problem when the votes are top-truncated. We show that the WAV problem is
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.07150
In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs among differential privacy (DP) and several important voting axioms: Pareto efficiency, SD-efficiency, PC-efficiency, Condorcet consistency, and Condorcet loser criterion. We provide upper and lower bounds on t
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07219
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct'' decision, o
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.11021
For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.04589
Fair distribution of indivisible tasks with non-positive valuations (aka chores) has given rise to a large body of work in recent years. A popular approximate fairness notion is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that any pairwise env
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.02986
In fair division applications, agents may have unequal entitlements reflecting their different contributions. Moreover, the contributions of agents may depend on the allocation itself. Previous fairness notions designed for agents with equal or pre-d
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.12653
We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein (2014)'s local dominance theory and determine its c
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.08873