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pro vyhledávání: '"Xi Alice Gao"'
Publikováno v:
Artificial Intelligence. 275:618-638
In many settings, an effective way of evaluating objects of interest is to collect evaluations from dispersed individuals and to aggregate these evaluations together. Some examples are categorizing online content and evaluating student assignments vi
Publikováno v:
AAAI
Much evidence has shown that prediction markets can effectively aggregate dispersed information about uncertain future events and produce remarkably accurate forecasts. However, if the market prediction will be used for decision making, a strategic p
Publikováno v:
EC
Collecting truthful subjective information from multiple individuals is an important problem in many social and online systems. While peer prediction mechanisms promise to elicit truthful information by rewarding participants with carefully construct
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce-EC '13
Gao, X A G, Zhang, J & Chen, Y 2013, What you jointly know determines how you act : Strategic interactions in prediction markets . in Proceedings of of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '13 . Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 489-506, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, United States, 16/06/2013 . https://doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482592
Gao, X A G, Zhang, J & Chen, Y 2013, What you jointly know determines how you act : Strategic interactions in prediction markets . in Proceedings of of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '13 . Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 489-506, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, United States, 16/06/2013 . https://doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482592
The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future event of interest. How well this goal is achieved depends on the behavior of self-interested market participants, which are crucially influenced by not o
Autor:
Yiling Chen, Xi Alice Gao
Publikováno v:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science ISBN: 9783642175718
WINE
WINE
Most existing market maker mechanisms for prediction markets are designed for events with a finite number of outcomes. All known attempts on designing market makers for forecasting continuous-outcome events resulted in mechanisms with undesirable pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d133c67084fb1ba1f04b7237cc95c3ed
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_44
Publikováno v:
EC: Electronic Commerce; 2013, p489-506, 18p