Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 567
pro vyhledávání: '"Wouter Dessein"'
Autor:
Whinston, Michael D., author
Publikováno v:
The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, 2016.
Externí odkaz:
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199826223.003.0008
Autor:
Michael D. Whinston
Publikováno v:
The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bd0a82b0cb0b1e692bd66379cfdf2553
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199826223.003.0008
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199826223.003.0008
The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the trend of many colleges moving to test-optional, and in some cases test-blind, admissions policies. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college is able to admit a student body th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d32d195dc62f601eb22d86b25d05ecf0
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07551
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07551
Autor:
Wouter Dessein, Andrea Prat
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 130:1477-1536
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4d3508e558298942d2be15e7352fa61b
https://doi.org/10.1086/718985
https://doi.org/10.1086/718985
Autor:
Wouter Dessein, Tano Santos
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 13:372-403
Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1e3a299e8c6663bbcbc5563c39fc18ab
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190025
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190025
How does task expertise affect the allocation of attention? Our theory argues that when attention is scarce, expertise and attention are complements: A manager optimally focuses her attention on tasks in which she has relatively more expertise; she
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d503ab8d9597df1d40783534686ab99a
We explore the relationship between the volatility of a firm’s local environment and its organizational structure. Using micro-level data on managers working for a large retailer, we empirically test and provide support for our theory that a more v
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dae1d0c843ffca48eb89162cc8d21ef0
Publikováno v:
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 32:508-544
Delegation is a central feature of organizational design that theory suggests should be aligned with the intensity of incentives. We explore a specific form of delegation, namely price delegation, whereby firms allow sales people to offer a maximum d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::35205688e2f25ddb743a7978300cb930
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/eww003
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/eww003
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 7:158-87
We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional firm and its ability to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about local conditions, a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6b8a0ec67494ddef5326c90491e3e8f3
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.20130100
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.20130100
Autor:
Wouter Dessein, Richard Holden
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We analyze a model of hierarchies in organizations where neither decisions themselves nor the delegation of decisions are contractible, and where power-hungry agents derive a private benefit from making decisions. Two distinct agency problems arise a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dd41875f0f2e51971cc03ff77e7e76ae
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3024631
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3024631