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pro vyhledávání: '"Woods III, JE"'
Autor:
Woods III, JE
I investigate syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence between logical theories and an recent objection thereto. I show that this recent criticism of syntactic accounts as extensionally inadequate is unwarranted by developing an account which is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=core_ac_uk__::d4117da986cb0dbbd2405fcc54b53f0b
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/126339/1/ITEP_CA_Final.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/126339/1/ITEP_CA_Final.pdf
Autor:
Woods III, JE
This is an opinionated overview of the Frege-Geach problem, in both its historical and contemporary guises. Covers Higher-order Attitude approaches, Tree-tying, Gibbard-style solutions, and Schroeder's recent A-type expressivist solution.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=core_ac_uk__::934a764734ebb25183c1dd26beb8718c
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108348/1/The_Frege-Geach_Problem_-_The_Routledge.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108348/1/The_Frege-Geach_Problem_-_The_Routledge.pdf
Autor:
Woods III, JE
Why do promises give rise to reasons? I consider a few possibilities which do not work, then outline a more plausible explanation of the normativity of promising—that it is constitutive of the practice of promising that promise-breaking implies bla
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=core_ac_uk__::dcacdfe1ca0031b4bd007f0694007fb6
Autor:
Burgess, JP, Woods III, JE
Ian Rumfitt, The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic, Oxford University Press, 2015, 345pp., $60.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198733638. Reviewed by John P. Burgess, Princeton University, and Jack Woods, Bilkent University.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=core_ac_uk__::c221ed13baefe46fdedd5f3541113e67
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108354/1/Rumfitt_Review_Final.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108354/1/Rumfitt_Review_Final.pdf
Autor:
Woods III, JE
Publikováno v:
Philosophers' Im
I argue against expressivism as a descriptive account of moral language. I do this by leveraging features of the connection between ordinary assertion and belief to test the putative connection between moral assertion and various non-cognitive states
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=core_ac_uk__::bbc0b4d6855b2f9f858c530f4739a650
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108299/1/expressivism-and-moores-paradox.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/108299/1/expressivism-and-moores-paradox.pdf