Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 50
pro vyhledávání: '"William S. Zwicker"'
Autor:
Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Ioannis Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Cosimo Vinci, William S. Zwicker, Dominik Peters
Publikováno v:
Bilo, V, Caragiannis, I, Flammini, M, Igarashi, A, Monaco, G, Peters, D, Vinci, C & Zwicker, W 2022, ' Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles ', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 131, pp. 197-221 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.006
We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility functions a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::15f6f0fc4e188c0bae6409b95ae5c187
http://hdl.handle.net/11697/175539
http://hdl.handle.net/11697/175539
Autor:
Ayumi Igarashi, William S. Zwicker
Fair division has been studied in both continuous and discrete contexts. One strand of the continuous literature seeks to award each agent with a single connected piece—a subinterval. The analogue for the discrete case corresponds to the fair divis
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::710717ae544dc07b188691adc0190e58
http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.08560
http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.08560
This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors inv
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 46:301-333
We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations-equivalently, dichotomous weak orders-similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference aggregation literature. The binary evaluation framework was introduced as a general approach to ag
Autor:
William S. Zwicker
We introduce the $(j,k)$-Kemeny rule -- a generalization of Kemeny's voting rule that aggregates $j$-chotomous weak orders into a $k$-chotomous weak order. Special cases of $(j,k)$-Kemeny include approval voting, the mean rule and Borda mean rule, as
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f2da56a1b1d73bb58cc879531e84814f
http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03999
http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03999
Autor:
William S. Zwicker
Publikováno v:
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ed9a6b993ffda86f1d27dbb49319e76a
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984.003
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984.003
Autor:
William S. Zwicker, M. Remzi Sanver
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 39:371-398
What is a monotonicity property? How should such a property be recast, so as to apply to voting rules that allow ties in the outcome? Our original interest was in the second question, as applied to six related properties for voting rules: monotonicit
Autor:
William S. Zwicker
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 69:517-522
Autor:
M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 38:553-574
Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t alone, by changing her vote from P v to $${P^\prime_{v}}$$ . A
Autor:
William S. Zwicker
Publikováno v:
Mathematical and Computer Modelling. 48:1357-1373
Smith [J.H. Smith, Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate, Econometrica 41 (1973) 1027-1041] and Young [H.P. Young, A note on preference aggregation, Econometrica 42 (1974) 1129-1131; H.P. Young, Social choice scoring functions, SIAM J.