Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 22
pro vyhledávání: '"William B. Heller"'
Autor:
William B. Heller, Didem Seyis
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy. 2:429-451
Publikováno v:
The Origins of Liberty
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3ad7d1889de0c81c1b24179a48ecfb2f
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1ddcz33.12
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1ddcz33.12
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Political Research. 55:681-701
Legislative checks give whoever wields them influence over policy making. It is argued in this article that this influence implies the ability not only to affect legislative content, but also to direct public resources toward private ends. Rational p
Publikováno v:
Comparative Political Studies. 47:715-742
This article takes a novel approach to the question of how bicameralism matters by asking not how it shapes policy outcomes, but rather how it shapes political parties. Bicameralism uniquely challenges political parties because party leaders have few
Autor:
William B. Heller, Katri K. Sieberg
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Political Economy. 26:351-362
The assumption of self-interested behavior makes it difficult to explain cooperation among strangers. Economics experiments and game-theoretic analyses suggest that cooperation can arise from a willingness to punish noncooperative behavior, even at p
Autor:
William B. Heller, Carol Mershon
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 52:910-925
Compared to U.S. political parties, parties in Italy (and Europe generally) are quite cohesive. Rarely do members of parliament vote against their copartisans in legislative divisions. Yet in Italy in recent years, legislators switch parties with see
Publikováno v:
Legislative Studies Quarterly. 33:171-198
We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise s ignificant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zer o, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average a
Autor:
William B. Heller, Katri K. Sieberg
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 135:399-413
Economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self-interested. In divide-the-dollar ultimatum games, participants turn down offers that would make them objectively better off. Similarly, drivers stuck in a
Autor:
William B. Heller
Publikováno v:
Annual Review of Political Science. 10:245-269
▪ Abstract This article surveys the rationales for and effects of legislative bicameralism. At heart, second chambers facilitate representation for groups or interests that otherwise might be ignored. They do so not only by making more legislative
Autor:
William B. Heller, Carol Mershon
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics. 67:536-559
Almost one-fourth of the members of the lower house in Italy, the Chamber of Deputies, switched parties at least once between 1996 and 2001. Why would a legislator abandon one party and enter another during a legislative term? Starting from the basic