Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 161
pro vyhledávání: '"W. Weibull"'
Autor:
Jörgen W. Weibull, Larry Samuelson
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 49:673-680
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 173:1-25
We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Each subject had to choose an action as first mover and a conditional action as second mover. All subjects also had to state their beliefs about others’ second
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 71:305-315
Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players.The reason is that the “right thing to do” may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under com
Autor:
Lars-Göran Mattsson, Jörgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
83rd EAGE Annual Conference & Exhibition.
Autor:
W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
83rd EAGE Annual Conference & Exhibition.
Autor:
Jörgen W. Weibull, Mark Voorneveld
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 163-186 (2011)
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilitie
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/eb2eb6e881654cb2aa84177519c7dc81
Autor:
Ingela Alger, Jörgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 8, Iss 3, p 38 (2017)
Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and mora
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1044679db0834cfea2d37892b98acc26
Autor:
Atahan Afsar, Jorgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 7, Iss 4, p 37 (2016)
We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subse
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4c12ee28e3644bb68fb2c69fe5edcc9f