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pro vyhledávání: '"Vlad Mares"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper, we document two shortcomings of Nash-in-Nash bargaining: outcomes depend on who earns operating profit (a violation of the Coase Theorem); and "schizophrenia," parties behaving "as if" they were bargaining against themselves. Schizophr
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In a private values, open auction, we show that bidder surplus can be expressed as a simple difference between unconditional moments of order statistics. The strength of the result is its simplicity and generality, as we dispense with the typical ass
Autor:
Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 152:1-40
We provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric …rst price auctions, connecting their equilibria to the �-concavity of the underlying type distributions, and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound
Autor:
Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 43:487-514
We study procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, a group of sellers (incumbents, qualified bidders) is given an advantage, based, for example, on better reliability, quality, or incumbency status. We show conditions under which for a
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper we study the impact of mergers among bidders when the auctioneer can respond optimally to changes in the market concentration. We find that the auctioneer's ability to exercise such "buyer power" limits the ability of the merged bidders
Autor:
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Vlad Mares
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 72:218-241
Consider a setting with n sellers having i.i.d. costs with log-concave density f from cumulative F, and a buyer who puts a premiumi on procuring from seller i. We show how for any given �1;��� ;�n; a sim- ple second price bonus auction can
Autor:
Mikhael Shor, Vlad Mares
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 35:37-56
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of industry concentration in common value auctions. Greater concentration of information among fewer bidders reduces competition but increases the precision of private estimates.
Autor:
Vlad Mares, Ronald M. Harstad
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 32:399-410
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing ru
Autor:
Vlad Mares, Ronald M. Harstad
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 109:264-282
When a seller has information that could help bidders to estimate asset value, a dictum of auction theory has been that all such information should be publicly announced to bidders. The possibility of privately revealing this information to one or mo
Autor:
Mikhael Shor, Vlad Mares
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. 12
Firms commonly form syndicates to bid jointly for financial assets. Recently, this practice has come under legal scrutiny motivated by models which suggest syndicates are anti-competitive. These models do not account for two important features of fin