Zobrazeno 1 - 7
of 7
pro vyhledávání: '"Vitor Farinha Luz"'
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Studies.
This paper studies a competitive model of insurance markets in which consumers are privately informed about their risk and risk preferences. We provide a characterization of the equilibria, which depend non-trivially on consumers’ type distribution
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dc8c7f1106f1566dedc18f4800d4d4b2
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad017
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad017
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Dynamics. 27:169-183
We investigate social insurance in a dynamic Mirrlees's ( 1971 ) economy for which each agent's labor market productivity is the product of her stochastic and privately observed ability and an aggregate, publicly observed, stochastic component. The i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bd49696cffdaa60201370d71523e5446
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.07.001
Autor:
Vitor Farinha Luz
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 12:1349-1391
This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::71acbcc82ef999c61d8c588961660f94
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2166
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2166
Autor:
Vitor Farinha Luz, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Humberto Moreira, Vinicius Carrasco, Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner
We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the mechanism generating the best revenue guarantee based on the inform
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f31bd70046de759766b3c5572cee7e6d
http://hdl.handle.net/11565/4013407
http://hdl.handle.net/11565/4013407
Autor:
Vitor Farinha Luz
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 148:2749-2762
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in auction settings with ‘rich’ type spaces, where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. The focus of the paper is on the concept of Bayes-Nash implementation. By con
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1ef8a8945c65f894b0f76de235c5cad1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.016
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.016
This paper considers the problem of a Principal (she) who faces a privately informed agent (he) and only knows one moment of the type distribution. Preferences are non- linear in the allocation and the Principal maximizes her worst-case expected prof
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5b0d5e48b9e2f29a4ee90fa84da5e573
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td642.pdf
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td642.pdf
We consider the problem of a seller who faces a privately informed buyer and only knows one moment of the distribution from which values are drawn. In face of this uncertainty, the seller maximizes his worst-case expected profits. We show that a robu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::a3224c9d9e1031de276854a92cf358fe
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td641.pdf
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td641.pdf