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pro vyhledávání: '"Virgil C. Aldrich"'
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry ISBN: 9789004463653
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::61e554bc837ce5f38e9e9e61b8b5ee8f
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004463653_013
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004463653_013
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry ISBN: 9789004463653
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3d7e0fdc66373379152c5e872be918f5
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004463653_010
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004463653_010
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry ISBN: 9789004463653
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::951e53ccd93246b7ebf8a7d23d885151
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004463653_009
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004463653_009
Autor:
Henry Veatch, Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
Noûs. 25:728
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cf22d10502d4cc612f7b8cc7f6140106
https://doi.org/10.2307/2215644
https://doi.org/10.2307/2215644
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
Mind. :512-533
The occasion for this meditation is Professor Sibley's extraordinarily careful recent essay' in favour of 'a modestly epistemic account of the basic notion of seeing' (82). In a nutshell, what it contends is that, properly speaking, to see anything i
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https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/lxxxiii.332.512
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/lxxxiii.332.512
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Investigations. 6:135-141
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https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5c8d8964ffecb8782c4b7ccee9900aa8
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1983.tb00478.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1983.tb00478.x
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. 20:149-164
‘Material thing’ is a two‐level concept. In ‘first‐order extension’ ‐ the field of perceptual experience ‐ it is a ‘body’ that may ‘body forth’ (show, express) a ‘content’, like the bodies of persons or pictures. In ‘sec
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https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::28b7a0da7e0895ae18b85cbb6441211a
https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747708601820
https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747708601820
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
Philosophy. 55:39-56
We already have a distinction between the intension and extension of (linguistic) terms. This is not simply the distinction that is operative in philosophy of mind, body, and action. There, the concern is with things, and with a physicalistic or a me
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https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100063737
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100063737
Autor:
Virgil C. Aldrich
Publikováno v:
Philosophy. 62:375-384
One should remember that Kripke says that he does not understand Wittgenstein's attack on an 'object and designation' model for sensation language1 and that he has 'not really discussed Wittgenstein's positive account of the nature of sensation langu
Externí odkaz:
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https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100038857
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100038857