Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 160
pro vyhledávání: '"Vincent J. Mooney"'
Publikováno v:
2022 North American Power Symposium (NAPS).
Autor:
Beren Semiz, M. Emre Gursoy, Md Mobashir Hasan Shandhi, Lara Orlandic, Vincent J. Mooney, Omer T. Inan
Publikováno v:
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering ISBN: 9783031063671
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a710359ad5f10d8c804e36edd0397f17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06368-8_19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06368-8_19
Autor:
Kevin Hutto, Vincent J. Mooney
Publikováno v:
MECO
Embedded systems in physically insecure environments are subject to additional security risk via capture by an adversary. A captured microchip device can be reverse engineered to recover internal buffer data that would otherwise be inaccessible throu
Publikováno v:
2020 IEEE Kansas Power and Energy Conference (KPEC).
Typical security risk assessment of cyber-physical systems measures the relative risk of individual components in the system with data from a domain expert. Such data may not come directly from the cyber-physical systems, but instead may come from th
Publikováno v:
Cryptography
Volume 5
Issue 2
Cryptography, Vol 5, Iss 12, p 12 (2021)
Volume 5
Issue 2
Cryptography, Vol 5, Iss 12, p 12 (2021)
The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructu
Publikováno v:
Journal of Hardware and Systems Security. 2:251-265
Corruption of data in embedded and medical devices can cause serious harm if not quickly detected. In this paper, we emphasize the part of the attack surface which entails inserting malicious hardware circuitry (Hardware Trojans) during the manufactu
Publikováno v:
VLSI-SoC
This paper surveys some prior work regarding attack models in a cyber-physical system and discusses the potential benefits. For comparison, the full paper will model a bad data injection attack scenario in power grid using the surveyed prior work.
Autor:
Michael Foreman, Alhad J. Daftardar, Patrick H. Coppock, Zayd Tolaymat, Gabriela Lopez, Vincent J. Mooney
Publikováno v:
MECO
For resource constrained embedded devices security is often an afterthought during design time. As new applications and devices are developed, they are handling more and more sensitive information. It is imperative to come up with effective solutions
Publikováno v:
2019 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC).
A detailed model of an attack on the power grid involves both a preparation stage as well as an execution stage of the attack. This paper introduces a novel Hybrid Attack Model (HAM) that combines Probabilistic Learning Attacker, Dynamic Defender (PL
Autor:
Momen K. Yacoub, Zayd Tolaymat, Alhad J. Daftardar, Patrick H. Coppock, Bruce L. Qin, Vincent J. Mooney
Publikováno v:
Microprocessors and Microsystems. 79:103270
Many security measures designed for large-scale compute hardware (e.g., workstations and servers) are not optimized for embedded systems. One such measure, Relocation Read-Only (RelRO), protects binary relocation sections from tampering after dynamic