Commitment and discretion in contracts: theory and evidence from retirement plans.

Autor: Kim, Jin‐Hyuk¹ (AUTHOR) jinhyuk.kim@colorado.edu, Vikander, Nick² (AUTHOR) nick.vikander@econ.ku.dk

Publikováno v: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Apr2023, Vol. 125 Issue 2, p461-488. 28p.

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Commitment and discretion in contracts: theory and evidence from retirement plans*

Autor: Hyuk-Kim, Jin, Vikander, Nick

Publikováno v: Hyuk-Kim, J & Vikander, N 2023, ' Commitment and Discretion in Contracts: Theory and Evidence from Retirement Plans ', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 461-488 . https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12523

We consider a firm’s problem of incentivizing its workforce through relational contracts, when workers effectively face a shorter time horizon due to possible separation shocks. Commitment issues then generate a trade-off between efficiency and dis

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9a67fa64a6a200dc8969e15cee938ade
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12523

Team-Based Incentives in Problem-Solving Organizations

Autor: Kim, Jin-Hyuk, Vikander, Nick

Publikováno v: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2015 May 01. 31(2), 262-286.

Externí odkaz: http://www.jstor.org/stable/44161458

Optimal Sales Schemes for Network Goods.

Autor: Parakhonyak, Alexei¹ aleksei.parakhonyak@economics.ox.ac.uk, Vikander, Nick² nick.vikander@econ.ku.dk

Publikováno v: Management Science. Feb2019, Vol. 65 Issue 2, p819-841. 23p. 1 Graph.