Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"Victoria L. Kreps"'
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 12:3-18
The set of all linear spaces of continuous two-person zero-sum games on the unit square with pure equilibrium points is considered. It is shown that the set contains maximal linearspaces of any finite dimension greater than three.
Autor:
Leon A. Petrosyan, Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 13:441-448
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
Automation and Remote Control. 80:362-379
Using a simplified multistage bidding model with asymmetrically informed agents, De Meyer and Saley [17] demonstrated an idea of endogenous origin of the Brownian component in the evolution of prices on stock markets: random price fluctuations may be
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps, Victor K. Domansky
Publikováno v:
Automation and Remote Control. 77:722-733
This paper considers multistep bidding models where several types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These random prices depend on "a state of nature" det
Autor:
Andrei Matveenko, Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. 22:1950008
We give a criterion of positivity for the value of a matrix game. We use the criterion to investigate conditions of positivity of value for two classes of games: payoff matrices with all elements outside of the main diagonal having the same sign and
Autor:
Victor K. Domansky, Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
RAIRO - Operations Research. 47:251-272
We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps, Misha Gavrilovich
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. 20:1750034
We consider random public signals on the state of two-person zero-sum game with incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game). To learn the state, each player chooses a finite automaton which receives the publi
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
Diskretnaya Matematika. 22:115-125
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider finite non-cooperative N person games with fixed numbers mi, i = 1, . . . , N , of pure strategies of player i. We propose the following question: is it possible to extend the vector space of finite non-cooperative m1 × m2 × . . . × mN
Autor:
Victoria L. Kreps, Misha Gavrilovich
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
It is well-known that large random structures may have non-random macroscopic properties. We give an example of non-random properties for a class of large optimization problems related to the computational problem MAXFLS^= of calculating the maximal