Zobrazeno 1 - 4
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pro vyhledávání: '"Victoria Brosi"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol 3, Iss 1, Pp 1-15 (2018)
In this work first it is shown, in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (1987), that the uncovered set in a multidimensional spatial voting situation (under the usual regularity conditions) does not necessarily coincide with the core even whe
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d74949461c6543228c3cd33a03f44ea6
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol 3, Iss 1, Pp 1-15 (2018)
In this work first it is shown, in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox\ud (1987), that the uncovered set in a multidimensional spatial voting situation\ud (under the usual regularity conditions) does not necessarily coincide with the\ud core
Autor:
Victoria Brosi, Anindya Bhattacharya
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 40:393-401
In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form (not necessarily with side payments) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neum
In this work we explore some properties of on-Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in the environment of multidimensional spatial voting situations. In our framework, the set of outcomes under consideration is some compact and convex subset of some finite
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::43194c27756e4b61a6fbfe0616bfadb5
http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q052009_abstract.pdf
http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q052009_abstract.pdf