Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"Vann McGee"'
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Springer Netherlands
Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f84793e3f71e4b96693455acf437bbba
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0656-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0656-9
Autor:
Vann McGee
An inductive definition of a predicate R characterizes the Rs as the smallest class which satisfies a basis clause of the form (β(x)→Rx), telling us that certain things satisfy R, together with one or more closure clauses of the form (Φ(x,R)→Rx
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f9460c6dc7b857b6342205463e683e21
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-y058-1
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-y058-1
Autor:
Vann McGee
The Cretan philosopher Epimenides said that Cretans always lie. Assuming, for the sake of argument, the mendacity of all other statements by Cretans, we get a paradox: if what Epimenides said was true, it must have been a lie, whereas if what he said
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f10fe934a5a2dbc3c9cf93d08a7b6aa0
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-y020-1
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-y020-1
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference ISBN: 9783319687315
J. R. Lucas argues against mechanism that an ideal, immortal agent whose mental activities could be mimicked by a Turing machine would be able, absurdly, to prove the Godel sentence for the set of arithmetical sentences she is able to prove. There ar
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::838424afc96473d1f63ae3c3121ff675
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68732-2_9
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68732-2_9
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Studia Logica. 101:641-646
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::640d2f567034b455d8d2edeed4f36135
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-013-9488-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-013-9488-1
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Vann McGee
Saving Truth from Paradox is a re-exciting development. The 70s and 80s were a time of excitement among people working on the semantic paradoxes. There were continual formal developments, with the constant hope that these results would yield deep ins
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::147fe151f345994605e077be0025b54c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9467-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9467-6
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Foundations of Logical Consequence
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b37be756d5f068fe5850b73f6ce5c8c0
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.003.0006
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.003.0006
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Nous. 39:397-425
That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's “Problem of the Many.” Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speaker
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8fdef5352a873d7a2a11b7a2557fbcf2
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00507.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00507.x
Autor:
Vann McGee
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 142:371-387
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce295fcad55d96ee7aaaabf89f12c867
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-3721-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-3721-z