Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"Vaccari, Federico"'
What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats interact to implement policy. Both can either be good, sharing the vot
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.17526
Autor:
Vaccari, Federico
This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.13605
Autor:
Vaccari, Federico
It is believed that interventions that change the media's costs of misreporting can increase the information provided by media outlets. This paper analyzes the validity of this claim and the welfare implications of those types of interventions that a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2108.11177
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization March 2024 219:74-103
Autor:
Vaccari, Federico
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main re
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.05317
Autor:
Vaccari, Federico
This thesis contains three chapters exploring the implications of strategically biased information on political outcomes. The first chapter studies how a politically motivated media outlet misreports information in order to endorse its preferred cand
Externí odkaz:
https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.754142
Autor:
Vaccari, Federico1 (AUTHOR) vaccari.econ@gmail.com
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. Nov2023, Vol. 76 Issue 4, p1363-1418. 56p.
Autor:
Vaccari, Federico
This paper analyzes the implications of those types of interventions that affect misreporting costs. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::14205b3eab707dc840856024bed5a7fa
We perform a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition in a strategic communication environment. Two equally informed senders with conflicting interests can misreport information at a cost. We compare a treatment where only on
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f2769a69f82675dfb5da9e9a00b22a0c