Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 15
pro vyhledávání: '"VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA"'
Autor:
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common per-period payoff at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage. Having received the report of th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1299::185bb7f06940712542f153a0db66dd4f
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28796
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28796
Autor:
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1299::ffd808f391a55f2e407187636d4aa984
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28799
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28799
Autor:
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to nonexperts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1299::f6689fe55af7070fafdbc640b041ad8f
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28798
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28798
Autor:
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
The paper is concerned with the interaction between two agents: an expert, announcing his probability that a particular state of the world will occur, and a non-expert decision-maker,who takes action according to his posterior beliefs. The decision-m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1299::8d77d43592ef4d8c39dad02949626964
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28797
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28797
Autor:
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
The paper is concerned with instructions as a way of setting premises for subsequent decisions in models of teams à la Marschak-Radner, under information diversification. The paper suggests that instructions can bridge people’s differences in know
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1299::b0bac779d05468d6c641898598db2670
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28800
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/28800
Autor:
VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
In assenza di conflitto, l’efficienza delle diverse forme organizzative scaturisce o dalla minimizzazione degli errori nei processi decisionali (es. Sah-Stiglitz (1986)) o dalla gestione di problemi di information overload (es. Radner (1993)). Lo s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1299::86dcf19ecf9eec8ebe3d16629d1e94af
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/11660
http://hdl.handle.net/10281/11660