Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 38
pro vyhledávání: '"Uday Bhanu Sinha"'
Autor:
Uday Bhanu Sinha, Neelanjan Sen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 138:165-188
Autor:
Uday Bhanu Sinha, Jiyun Cao
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 104:71-77
The existing literature has considered licensing of a patented cost-reducing innovation either in a homogeneous good industry or in a differentiated goods industry. We consider a new model of patent licensing between producers of a homogeneous good w
Publikováno v:
Indian Economic Review. 54:1-6
Publikováno v:
The Manchester School. 88:575-583
It is usually believed that the presence of labour unions is detrimental for the consumers since it raises wage. We show that this view may not be true if we endogenise the impacts of labour unions on firms' corporate strategies such as merger and ac
Publikováno v:
International Review of Economics & Finance. 53:16-24
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that a final goods producer may outsource input production to an outside supplier even if the final goods producer possesses a superior input-production technology compared to the outside supplier. Such
Autor:
Tarun Kabiraj, Uday Bhanu Sinha
Publikováno v:
Indian Growth and Development Review. 10:3-15
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a rea
Autor:
Uday Bhanu Sinha
Publikováno v:
Indian Economic Review. 53:405-407
Autor:
Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu Sinha
The purpose of this paper is to show that export cartels are not necessarily harmful for consumers in the importing countries. Using the strategic trade policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985a), we show that, contrary to the harmful effect, produc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::70fabcd8914ab49112495d1158f3b2f8
Autor:
Uday Bhanu Sinha
Publikováno v:
Economic Modelling. 57:93-105
We study how to transfer a patented innovation to competing firms. We consider a Cournot duopoly market with asymmetric pre-innovation costs and an independent patent holder who is not a producer in the market. There are two kinds of cost reducing in
Publikováno v:
Indian Economic Review