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According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are (or are constituted by) human beings rather than t

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c9927ce8d45bed744d81316a0a522e0f
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa020

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Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity

Autor: Rina Tzinman

Publikováno v: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 101:22-42

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::01c937ec6b30ff429e7f929855d28c14
https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12291

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Is Romeo dead? On the persistence of organisms

Autor: Rina Tzinman

Publikováno v: Synthese

According to a prominent view of organism persistence (“vitalicism”), organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view (“somaticism”), organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b9f1da9e80d33e95b8d4a852e3e05d4d
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1409-9

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Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals

Autor: Rina Tzinman

Publikováno v: Animals ISBN: 9783884057278

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2c8505d957ea9a5fec9cbe77809d9941
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2nrzh43.13

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