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pro vyhledávání: '"Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, Alexandros"'
Autor:
Dütting, Paul, Gergatsouli, Evangelia, Rezvan, Rojin, Teng, Yifeng, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, Alexandros
We study the prophet secretary problem, a well-studied variant of the classic prophet inequality, where values are drawn from independent known distributions but arrive in uniformly random order. Upon seeing a value at each step, the decision-maker h
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.11144
Autor:
Ezra, Tomer, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca, Russo, Matteo, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, Alexandros
We consider prophet inequalities under downward-closed constraints. In this problem, a decision-maker makes immediate and irrevocable choices on arriving elements, subject to constraints. Traditionally, performance is compared to the expected offline
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.03361
Autor:
Correa, José, Cristi, Andrés, Feuilloley, Laurent, Oosterwijk, Tim, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, Alexandros
In the secretary problem we are faced with an online sequence of elements with values. Upon seeing an element we have to make an irrevocable take-it-or-leave-it decision. The goal is to maximize the probability of picking the element of maximum value
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07869
We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling $m$ items to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we assume that
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04220
Akademický článek
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We design simple and robust mechanisms and algorithms for fundamental problems in auction design and online decision-making. We rethink central assumptions in three well-studied theoretical models and frameworks: Bayesian revenue-optimal auctions, th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______518::72e3c2a84f4b142f8692273350e8530c
https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1632254
https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1632254
Autor:
Correa, José, Cristi, Andrés, Feuilloley, Laurent, Oosterwijk, Tim, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, Alexandros, Marx, Dániel
Publikováno v:
SODA
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2047-2058
STARTPAGE=2047;ENDPAGE=2058;TITLE=Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2047-2058
STARTPAGE=2047;ENDPAGE=2058;TITLE=Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)
In the secretary problem we are faced with an online sequence of elements with values. Upon seeing an element we have to make an irrevocable take-it-or-leave-it decision. The goal is to maximize the probability of picking the element of maximum value
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c978c360408f2a7fb5d08f9872a58882
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.122
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.122
Autor:
Correa, Jos��, Cristi, Andr��s, Feuilloley, Laurent, Oosterwijk, Tim, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, Alexandros
In the secretary problem we are faced with an online sequence of elements with values. Upon seeing an element we have to make an irrevocable take-it-or-leave-it decision. The goal is to maximize the probability of picking the element of maximum value
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::940820071c74391c5dfc6086edb210f9
http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07869
http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07869