Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 140
pro vyhledávání: '"Transferable utility games"'
Publikováno v:
EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics, Vol 11, Iss , Pp 100090- (2022)
A game-theoretic approach based on the framework of transferable-utility cooperative games is developed to assess the reliability of transfer nodes in public transportation networks in the case of stochastic transfer times. A cooperative game is defi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/5ac0ae5db98341b9a143f7f53ce3a155
Autor:
Elena Yanovskaya, Bas Dietzenbacher
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 114, 105-109. Elsevier
A solution for transferable utility games is self-antidual if it assigns to each game the set of payoff allocations that it assigns to the antidual game with opposite sign. Well-known examples of self-antidual solutions are the core, the Shapley valu
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
Autor:
Bas Dietzenbacher, Elena Yanovskaya
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 108, 116-121. Elsevier
This note shows that the egalitarian Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for transferable utility games is self-antidual on the class of exact partition games. By applying a careful antiduality analysis, we derive several new axiomatic characterizations. M
Autor:
Elena Yanovskaya, Bas Dietzenbacher
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), 1-22. Springer
This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (cf. Branzei et al. (Banach Center Publ 71:39–46, 2006)) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility which extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (Econometrica 57:615–635, 1
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c2e7f6111abada6f03166f697893264f
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/1016d263-5c43-482f-a054-6aa4dbc19666
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/1016d263-5c43-482f-a054-6aa4dbc19666
Publikováno v:
AIRO Springer Series ISBN: 9783030868406
In the theory of congestion games, the Braess’ paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative game-theoretic setti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::729f0ea5c0c4883b36a147d1d1406a03
http://hdl.handle.net/11568/1117914
http://hdl.handle.net/11568/1117914
This note shows that the egalitarian Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for transferable utility games is self-antidual on the class of exact partition games. By applying a careful antiduality analysis, we derive several new axiomatic characterizations. M
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::51496cd80492809a58619b9b5925fbd6
This note shows that the egalitarian Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for transferableutility games is self-antidual on the class of exact partition games. By applying a careful antiduality analysis, we derive several new axiomatic characterizations. Mo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___01181::341bd34345f583a704533a5bee14f02a
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/0b8133f8-cab7-46ae-8881-03cb32f26843
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/0b8133f8-cab7-46ae-8881-03cb32f26843
Autor:
Dietzenbacher, Bas, Yanovskaya, E.
This note shows that the egalitarian Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for transferable utility games is self-antidual on the class of exact partition games. By applying a careful antiduality analysis, we derive several new axiomatic characterizations. M
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::76bf9e83405690f34553176870c97c06
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/0b8133f8-cab7-46ae-8881-03cb32f26843
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/0b8133f8-cab7-46ae-8881-03cb32f26843
Autor:
Jean Derks
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 146-151. Elsevier Science
We consider transferable utility games, where restricted cooperation is modeled by a fixed mapping assigning to each coalition the set of players that are controlled by this coalition. We study the Shapley value on the resulting class of restricted g