Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 163
pro vyhledávání: '"Toyotaka Sakai"'
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics. 25:902-941
We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice stays at 20%, whereas the rate increases to 47% among those wh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::79e7333e246c91bd049f27debd88854f
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09736-5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09736-5
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics. 26:249-250
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::96645376c6d7a39c758ee1bd6429c1a3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09746-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09746-x
Autor:
Toyotaka Sakai, Noriaki Okamoto
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 23:75-89
Jean-Charles de Borda introduced the Borda rule with the motivation of avoiding the so-called pairwise-majority-loser. We revisit this topic by examining the uniqueness of the Borda rule as a scoring rule that is consistent with the pairwise-majority
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c59bc5cdc336f1a5edb7f93aa5293575
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00221-3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00221-3
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without providing advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without advice, the rate increases to 47% wit
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::999c5c174dd738cf37ce1fd0ed554502
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3324776
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3324776
Autor:
Toyotaka Sakai
Publikováno v:
The Japanese Economic Review. 68:323-332
A local referendum was held in Kodaira City, Tokyo, on May 26 of 2013, but the voting box remained sealed. It was because the voter turnout did not reach the 50%-hurdle to open the box. Based on the Rousseausian considera
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::db20dc347f768b941d55370e0586029d
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12115
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12115
Autor:
Toyotaka Sakai
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 47:481-500
Equal treatment of all generations is a fundamental ethical principle in intertemporal welfare economics. This principle is expressed in anonymity axioms of orderings on the set of infinite utility streams. We first show that an ordering satisfies fi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3c4e3c6ee4942a96522857cb4de5ddf2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0973-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0973-0
Autor:
Toyotaka Sakai
Publikováno v:
Japanese Economic Review. 66:260-270
In Book IV, Chapter II of The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that the nearer opinion approaches unanimity in an assembly, the greater is the dominance of the general will. The present study revisits this classical argument in a one-dim
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::683a1c5e52fdea7b7937530b0a718d0b
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12063
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12063
Autor:
Masao Ogaki, Toyotaka Sakai
Publikováno v:
Japanese Economic Review. 66:147-149
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::33eb5fbd20d95b60f3306c6e1714450c
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12071
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12071
Autor:
Toyotaka Sakai
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 9:255-265
In single-item auctions, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-imposition if and only if it is either a second price auction with a reserve price or the no-trade rule. In this characterization, any reserv
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7490b1d3a5e01448a2aae9f55f5804e6
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x
Autor:
Toyotaka Sakai
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 17:17-26
In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This charac
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce49d6a731a3e08d9ed28cbf8a11f6d9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5