Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 144
pro vyhledávání: '"Ton Storcken"'
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics, 18(2), 597-632. Korean Econometric Society
Matchings in a market may have varying degrees of compromise from efficiency, fairness, and or stability. A distance function allows to quantify such concepts or the (dis)similarity between any two matchings. There are a few attempts to propose such
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fb42f2d89fa30d53dd0a8875ecfa180c
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4882
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4882
Autor:
Shashwat Khare, Ton Storcken
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 59(3), 585-604. Springer, Cham
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some partial order. This partial order might differ for different individuals. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which these restricted
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1cd1fcf5afdf13ca7aa8d045adede865
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design, 26(3), 447-467. Springer Verlag
The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are l
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6be19cc24d5d3def7d6228037b347dcd
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00259-2
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 55(4), 759-776. Springer, Cham
We consider collective evaluation problems, where individual grades given to candidates are combined to obtain a collective grade for each of these candidates. In this paper, we prove the following two results: (1) a collective evaluation rule is upd
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8c1e36e03ca3a3b08c2ecad5aa27d87a
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01263-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01263-1
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision, 91(3), 313-336. Springer, Cham
In this paper, we consider choice functions that are unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof and consider domains that are single-peaked on some tree. We prove the following three results in this setting. First, there exists a unani
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2c943cad01cc160397545d13516dcb2b
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/5cc600d0-b99b-4775-974e-e929b696e658
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/5cc600d0-b99b-4775-974e-e929b696e658
Autor:
Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 84, 46-55. Elsevier Science
We consider domains in strategic voting problems which satisfy three properties, namely top-connectedness, pervasiveness, and richness. We prove the following two results for such a domain: (i) it admits non-dictatorial, unanimous, and strategy-proof
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7dd43ddc2d8f5b1e927bad86a5379645
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.001
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 56(4), 835-853. Springer, Cham
Despite being a well-studied decision rule, the Slater rule has not been analyzed axiomatically. In this paper, we show that it is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, tournamental, tie-breaking, and gradual. Thereby we provide a characterizati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::82c39eacc4cccface366f6b5c681d62d
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/8e4969a8-2999-4142-b4d0-2aae725cc40e
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/8e4969a8-2999-4142-b4d0-2aae725cc40e
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 90, 150-159. Elsevier
We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modeled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the distance of their dips to the nearer p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::12d75a1b72d8e5a0246f71f731f486ce
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.001
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters, 183:108567. Excerpta Medica, Elsevier Science
We consider domains that satisfy pervasiveness and top-connectedness, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-dictatorial, Pareto optimal, and group strategy-proof choice rules on those domains.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4f25d2df8447fcd2e6f1ba392ae58429
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/4789f14d-6828-43e1-ab35-59483684e18e
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/4789f14d-6828-43e1-ab35-59483684e18e
Autor:
Ton Storcken, Abhinaba Lahiri
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 53(1), 49-62. Springer, Cham
We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rule
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f7d8287bb38724ff81251a1e1f67803f
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/e4af41ed-c8af-4908-aa8d-452da1b31979
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/e4af41ed-c8af-4908-aa8d-452da1b31979