Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 241
pro vyhledávání: '"Tomoji Shogenji"'
Autor:
Gerhard Schurz
Publikováno v:
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 9:83-89
Autor:
Chang-Seong Hong1 cshong@mnstate.edu, Tomoji Shogenji2 tshogenji@ric.edu
Publikováno v:
Philosophy East & West: A Quarterly of Comparative Philosophy. Oct2024, Vol. 74 Issue 4, p745-766. 22p.
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji
Publikováno v:
Conjunctive Explanations ISBN: 9781003184324
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3bf1723f6991dbcfe843215f7ffe4e37
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003184324-7
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003184324-7
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji
Publikováno v:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 198:10939-10957
This paper proposes an analysis of surprise formulated in terms of proximity to the truth, to replace the probabilistic account of surprise. It is common to link surprise to the low (prior) probability of the outcome. The idea seems sensible because
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji, William Roche
Publikováno v:
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 69:577-604
This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. W...
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji
Publikováno v:
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 32:229-231
Gerhard Schurz’s new book is an ambitious attempt to solve Hume’s problem of induction by techniques developed in computational learning theory. The book advances two major theses. The first is neg...
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji
This book develops new techniques in formal epistemology and applies them to the challenge of Cartesian skepticism. It introduces two formats of epistemic evaluation that should be of interest to epistemologists and philosophers of science: the dual-
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji
Publikováno v:
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 68:847-874
Autor:
Tomoji Shogenji, Martin L. Jönsson
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 196:221-237
We propose a coherence account of the conjunction fallacy applicable to both of its two paradigms (the M–A paradigm and the A–B paradigm). We compare our account with a recent proposal by Tentori et al. (J Exp Psychol Gen 142(1): 235–255, 2013)